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Abstract
Many of the most important government programs make transfers in kind as opposed to in 
cash. Making transfers in kind has the obvious cost that recipients would at least weakly
prefer cost-equivalent cash transfers. But making transfers in kind can have benefits as well,
including better targeting transfers to desired recipients. In this paper, we exploit large-scale 
randomized experiments run by three state Medicaid programs to investigate this central tradeoff
for in-kind provision. Despite the large distortion from the in-kind provision of formal home
care, the benefit from better targeting transfers to high-marginal utility types appears to be even
greater. This highlights an important cost of recent policy reforms toward more flexible, cash-
like benefits.
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1 Introduction 
In-kind transfers are a ubiquitous feature of government programs, private contracts, and 
charitable programs. The U.S. government spends more than 12 percent of GDP on in-
kind health care, child care, and schooling alone (Currie and Gahvari, 2008). The recent 
Affordable Care Act increased in-kind transfers substantially through expanded Medicaid 
eligibility and subsidies for health insurance. Making transfers in kind has the obvious 
cost that recipients would at least weakly prefer cost-equivalent cash transfers. But making 
transfers in kind can have benefits as well, including better targeting transfers to desired 
recipients (Nichols and Zeckhauser, 1982; Blackorby and Donaldson, 1988). 
We analyze this central tradeoff of in-kind provision in the context of long term care. Al­
though long-term care is one of the largest financial risks people face over the life cycle, much 
of it is not insured. We investigate the importance of a particular barrier to insuring this 
risk: costly state verification. In particular, we investigate the extent to which hard-to-verify 
heterogeneity in the cost of coping with bad health constrains risk sharing and shapes the 
optimal benefit design. 
To see the potential importance of costly state verification in long-term care, consider the 
following example. Two 80-year-olds have the same severe chronic health problems that 
make difficult even simple activities like eating and bathing. Each faces two possibilities: 
receive a significant amount of assistance at home or go to a nursing home—something both 
would rather avoid. The key difference between the two people is that one has a smaller 
cost of coping with bad health: One has a healthy spouse who is willing and able to provide 
informal care, whereas the other must purchase costly formal home care (eight hours per 
day would cost approximately $40,000 per year) if he is to avoid going to a nursing home. 
This difference in the cost of coping with bad health means that the same health problems 
have vastly different effects on the marginal utility of wealth of the two individuals. 
To the extent that ex-post differences in the cost of coping with bad health are uncertain 
ex ante, the first-best insurance contract makes larger transfers to people with larger coping 
costs. But such transfers are infeasible in practice if coping costs cannot be contracted on. It 
may be difficult, for example, to contract on the preferences of an individual and her family 
about privacy and close contact. In the second-best case in which coping costs cannot be 
verified at reasonable cost, insurance programs must offer the same benefit to everyone. 
Because a cash benefit can be expected to attract people regardless of their coping costs, it 
cannot implement the (ex-ante) valuable transfers from people with smaller coping costs to 
people with larger coping costs. This is a major failure of insurance. 
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This raises the possibility that non-cash benefits might improve risk sharing. A natural 
candidate is an in-kind benefit of formal home care, which is likely to be more valuable to 
people with larger coping costs. To the extent that people with smaller coping costs are less 
likely to take up the home care benefit, in-kind home care is targeted toward people with 
greater coping costs and, presumably, higher marginal utility. Even with in-kind benefits, 
however, information frictions limit the extent of risk sharing since an attractive home care 
benefit may appeal even to people with relatively low coping costs. As a result, there is a 
fundamental tradeoff between providing benefits that are more valuable to recipients (for 
which less restrictive cash-like benefits are best) and providing benefits that better target 
transfers to higher-marginal utility types (for which more restrictive in-kind benefits are 
best). 
In principle, both the costs and benefits of providing transfers in kind could be large. Em­
pirical work is therefore essential for evaluating these policies. Yet little empirical work has 
investigated the costs and benefits of providing transfers in kind in a unified framework. 
In this paper, we develop a general approach for estimating the targeting benefit and dis­
tortion cost of in-kind provision that shares much in common with the literature on optimal 
taxation. We use this approach to investigate the consequences of providing formal home 
care benefits in kind. The theory highlights the central importance of two key factors in 
determining the desirability of in-kind transfers: the sensitivity of the demand for the good 
to the composition of benefits and the distribution of the level of demand for the good. 
To estimate the sensitivity of the demand for formal care to the composition of benefits, 
we take advantage of large-scale experiments run by three state Medicaid programs known 
as the Cash and Counseling demonstrations. These experiments randomized a subset of 
Medicaid in-kind home care participants to a (near-)cash benefit. Existing research on the 
Cash and Counseling experiments has focused on characterizing the effects of in-kind versus 
cash benefits on various outcomes, such as recipients’ satisfaction, health, and healthcare 
consumption (see Brown et al., 2007, for a review). Key findings include that people ran­
domized to the traditional Medicaid in-kind home care benefit report lower satisfaction and 
slightly worse health. These findings have led to calls for more flexible, cash-like benefits. 
Yet to our knowledge, no research has attempted to quantify the net welfare effects of in-kind 
provision of home care benefits. 
The Cash and Counseling experiments are especially useful for evaluating the consequences 
of in-kind provision for two reasons. First, estimates of the demand for formal care based 
on non-experimental data face a particularly difficult identification problem: Many factors 
that shift the supply of formal care also shift the supply of informal care—and thereby shift 
the demand for formal care, causing simultaneity bias. Second, the price variation generated 
3
 
by the experiments spans the range of interest for policy, from the market price to a zero 
price. Our results reveal that the demand for formal home care is highly sensitive to the 
composition of benefits. On average, people randomized to the in-kind transfer consumed 
twice as much formal care as those randomized to the cash transfer. We estimate that a one 
dollar increase in the price of formal care reduces consumption by 1.8 hours per week. This 
price sensitivity implies that providing someone 14 hours of formal home care per week (the 
average in the Cash and Counseling demonstration states) causes an ex-post deadweight loss 
of 72 percent of Medicaid’s spending on the individual’s care. In-kind provision of formal 
care apparently causes a large and costly distortion. 
We estimate the second key factor determining the desirability of in-kind transfers of for­
mal care—the distribution of demand for formal care—using the National Long-Term Care 
Survey. The data reveal significant heterogeneity in the level of demand for formal care. 
Even among people with severe chronic health problems, most do not consume any formal 
care, mainly because they rely on informal care instead (Barczyk and Kredler, 2016). Among 
those who do consume formal care, the distribution of care consumption features a long right 
tail; some people consume large amounts of care at significant out-of-pocket cost. Moreover, 
much of the heterogeneity in formal care is uncorrelated with any observables in the data, 
including the main candidates one might think to use as “tags” in order to direct benefits 
to high-marginal utility groups (Akerlof, 1978). 
Using our estimates of the sensitivity and distribution of demand for formal care, we analyze 
the welfare consequences of alternative home care benefit designs. First, we take as given the 
standard eligibility criteria for home care benefits and compare alternative benefit designs, 
from a pure in-kind benefit (a 100 percent subsidy rate on formal care) to a pure cash policy 
(no subsidy on formal care). We find that across a wide range of assumptions, the optimal 
subsidy on formal care is significantly greater than zero and is often fairly close to one 
(under which the out-of-pocket price for formal care is zero). Second, we estimate the value 
of using tags—conditioning benefits on individuals’ verifiable characteristics such as objective 
measures of health. We find that even tags based on characteristics that are highly correlated 
with formal care consumption have little benefit, since much of the relevant heterogeneity 
occurs within groups of people with the same observable characteristics. Together, these 
results show that despite the large distortion caused by the optimal formal care subsidy, 
welfare is significantly greater under the subsidy than it is under alternative cash-benefit 
programs, including those that use tags to offer different cash benefits to different groups. 
The desirability of providing formal care in kind arises from the significant heterogeneity in 
the demand for formal care, which in the absence of a large formal care subsidy translates 
into significant heterogeneity in non-care consumption and marginal utility. 
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These results have important policy implications. The current equilibrium—in which much 
risk is uninsured, distortions are large, and the means-tested Medicaid program is the primary 
payer—has many obvious drawbacks. Many recent policy reforms seek to improve matters 
by making benefits more flexible or cash-like.1 Yet to our knowledge, no prior research has 
attempted to measure the costs and benefits of these reforms in a unified framework. Our 
analysis fills this gap. On the one hand, our finding that formal care consumption is highly 
sensitive to the composition of benefits implies, consistent with the arguments of advocates 
for more cash-like benefits, that many recipients would be significantly better off ex post with 
a cost-equivalent cash transfer. It also implies that a large “moral hazard tax” plagues most 
long-term care insurance contracts—an under-appreciated difficulty facing a market with 
many other challenges besides—and raises the effective loads to consumers above existing 
estimates (e.g., Brown and Finkelstein, 2007; Friedberg et al., 2014). On the other hand, our 
analysis suggests that the large cost of providing home care in kind might be an unfortunate 
but necessary cost of insuring the risk from chronic health problems. The cost of coping 
with chronic health problems appears to vary greatly, even within groups of people with the 
same observable characteristics. As a result, under a wide range of assumptions it is optimal 
to have a significant in-kind component of home care benefits. This finding raises concerns 
about recent reforms that make long-term care benefits more flexible and cash-like. 
A central contribution of this paper is to develop an approach for estimating the targeting 
benefit and distortion cost of in-kind provision. We do this by adapting a standard approach 
in the literature on optimal taxation to the context of in-kind benefits. This provides a link 
between the theoretical and empirical literatures on in-kind benefits, which, as Currie and 
Gahvari (2008) note, have been largely disconnected so far.2 The theoretical literature on 
in-kind benefits investigates a variety of potential benefits of in-kind provision in addition 
to targeting, including increasing the efficiency of the tax system (Munro, 1992), reduc­
ing moral hazard in the context of the Samaritan’s Dilemma (Bruce and Waldman, 1991), 
internalizing externalities, indulging paternalistic preferences, shifting prices in a desirable 
way (“pecuniary effects,” Cunha et al., 2011), mitigating asymmetric information problems, 
solving political economy problems, and redistributing resources within households or fami­
1Several European countries, including Germany, France, and Italy, have major cash-benefit programs 
(Da Roit and Le Bihan, 2010). In the United States, fifteen states created Cash and Counseling programs 
by 2009 (Doty et al., 2010), and early versions of the bill that became the Affordable Care Act included a 
long-term care insurance program that would have paid cash benefits. This program, known as the CLASS 
(Community Living Assistance Services and Supports) Act, was eventually repealed due to concerns about 
its budgetary sustainability. 
2A canonical in-kind transfer is equivalent to a non-linear price subsidy, under which purchases of the 
good are subsidized at a 100 percent rate up to a fixed quantity limit beyond which further purchases are 
not subsidized. The key feature of an in-kind transfer is that it changes the relative price of the transferred 
good. This feature is shared by many programs that make what appear to be cash transfers as well. For 
example, health insurance reimbursements (in cash) for health care expenses incurred depend on actions 
taken by the insured (consuming care). 
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lies (see Currie and Gahvari, 2008, for a review). Some of these other potential advantages 
of in-kind provision may be important in the context of home care as well, especially tax 
system efficiency (since providing informal care appears to reduce market work, e.g., Ettner, 
1995) and perhaps the Samaritan’s Dilemma (providing care to one’s elderly parents may 
make it more likely that one will rely on means-tested transfers in the future). These other 
potential benefits are an interesting topic for future research. The empirical literature on 
in-kind benefits is mostly focused on the consumption distortion cost of providing benefits 
in kind, especially in the case of food stamps. Moffitt (1989), Whitmore (2002), and Hoynes 
and Whitmore Schanzenbach (2009), for example, all find that providing food in kind (via 
food stamps) has relatively small effects on recipients’ choices relative to cost-equivalent cash 
transfers. This is because the benefit levels are lower than many recipients’ food purchases 
and because some possibility of resale exists. The apparent similarity of food stamps to cash 
reduces the likelihood that they have important targeting effects.3 Our hope is that the 
approach we develop in this paper proves fruitful in other contexts as well. 
2 Theory 
This section presents a simple model of in-kind benefits that focuses on the targeting benefit 
and distortion cost of in-kind provision. It combines features from the welfare analysis of a 
tax or subsidy, where efficiency costs are central, with features from optimal income taxation 
and the welfare analysis of social insurance, where redistribution across types is central. 
The key feature of in-kind provision is that the size of the transfer an individual receives 
depends on his or her consumption of the good in question. One can view an in-kind 
benefit program as providing a cash benefit while at the same time imposing a restriction 
on recipients that they must consume at least a certain amount of the good in question. As 
Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982) emphasize, imposing restrictions on recipients can improve 
the targeting of benefits to desired recipients who cannot otherwise be distinguished from 
would-be “mimics,” if meeting the restriction is more costly for mimics than for desired 
recipients. Imposing such a restriction relaxes the incentive compatibility constraints on 
mimics’ participation and thereby allows the program to make greater transfers to desired 
recipients. 
An in-kind benefit can be modeled as a (potentially non-linear) price subsidy. Many in-
kind benefit programs, such as food stamps, offer individuals up to a fixed quantity of the 
good at no charge. When resale is not possible, this has the same effect on a participating 
3Food stamps may have important targeting effects even if they do not distort consumption if stigma or 
other factors affect take up. 
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individual’s budget constraint as a non-linear price subsidy of 100 percent on units up to the 
benefit limit and 0 percent on units above the limit.4 In this section we focus on the case of 
a subsidy program with no quantity limit. We do this both for simplicity of exposition and 
because in many states, including the states that ran the Cash and Counseling experiments, 
the Medicaid home care program does not appear to have binding benefit limits in practice. 
The results are easily extended to cases with benefit limits. 
The key considerations for in-kind provision can be seen in Figure 1. Figure 1 shows the 
values (in terms of equivalent variations) and efficiency costs of a price subsidy on good 
X for each of two consumers with different levels of demand for X. The price subsidy is 
worth less to each consumer than it costs the government or insurance company to provide 
due to the induced consumption distortion. The size of this distortion is increasing in the 
compensated own-price elasticity of demand. This is entirely standard. Less-commonly 
emphasized is the key role of heterogeneity in the level of demand for X in determining 
both the distributional consequences of subsidizing X and the share of total spending on the 
subsidy that is costed away by distortions. The same price subsidy is more valuable to people 
who consume more of the subsidized good, so, relative to a cost-equivalent cash benefit, the 
subsidy redistributes toward people who consume more X from people who consume less X. 
In addition, the share of the program’s spending on the subsidy that benefits the recipient as 
opposed to being costed away by distorting consumption is increasing in the recipient’s level 
of demand for the good. As a result, the extent to which consumption distortions reduce 
the desirability of in-kind provision depends not only on the price sensitivity of demand but 
also on the distribution of the level of demand across types. 
2.1 The benefit program and its budget constraint 
Consider the problem of designing a mandatory benefit program for a population of ex-ante 
identical individuals whose ex-post distribution of types is F (θ).5 An individual’s type, 
θi ∼ F (θ), embeds all of the individual’s characteristics that are relevant for determining 
the costs and benefits of alternative benefit designs, including any relevant heterogeneity in 
preferences and budget constraints. The planner knows the distribution of types, F (θ), but 
4The nature of resale opportunities, if any, is an important determinant of the effects of in-kind benefit 
programs. In the case of home care benefits, resale is impossible. In the case of food stamps, by contrast, 
resale markets are an important feature of the environment. Whitmore (2002) presents survey evidence that 
food stamps trade at about 65 percent of their face value in the resale market. 





cannot verify any single individual’s type.6,7 
Consider an idealized in-kind benefit program that potentially combines two elements: a 
cash benefit, b, and a linear subsidy on good X, σ. The cash benefit and subsidy rate 
are common across all eligible individuals and are automatic in the sense that there are no 
take-up decisions; all eligible individuals receive the cash benefit and are subsidized on their 
purchases of good X. Two special cases of this combined cash-plus-subsidy program are a 
pure cash-benefit program (b > 0, σ = 0) and a pure subsidy program with no cash benefit 
(b = 0, σ > 0). A pure in-kind benefit program like Medicaid home care has a zero cash 
component and a full subsidy, (b = 0, σ = 1). 
Average per-eligible spending on the program, B, is divided between funding the cash benefit, 
b, and the subsidy on X, σ: 
(b + (σpX (σ))xX (σ; θ)) f(θ)dθ = B, 
Θ 
where pX (σ) is the subsidy-exclusive price of X (the sellers’ price) and xX (σ; θ) is the con­
sumption of X by type θ as a function of the subsidy rate. 
2.2 Analysis of a budget-neutral shift toward in-kind benefits 
This section analyzes a marginal shift in benefits toward in-kind benefits. This shift involves 
marginally increasing the subsidy rate, σ, and at the same time decreasing the cash benefit 
in order to maintain the same program budget. 
For simplicity, suppose that the supply of every good is perfectly elastic. In this case, an 
increase in the subsidy reduces buyers’ after-subsidy price of X one-for-one (no incidence 
0 
X , and has no effect on the prices of goods other than X,
on supply), pX (σ) = (1 − σ)p
0 0pi(σ) = p = X, where p
6We focus on the problem of designing benefits for a population of ex-post heterogeneous individuals 
who cannot be verifiably distinguished. This population could be a sub-population of a broader population, 
where the sub-population is distinguished from the broader population by the values of some verifiable 
characteristics. Differences in verifiable characteristics allow the program to “partition” the population into 
sub-groups and treat these groups differently. Groups of individuals who can be verifiably distinguished can 
be given different benefits directly; the planner need not resort to imposing restrictions on recipients in order 
to redistribute across these groups. In the extreme case in which all of the heterogeneity in marginal utility 
occurs across rather than within groups, pure cash-benefit contracts can achieve the first-best allocation. In 
the opposite extreme in which all of the heterogeneity in marginal utility occurs within rather than across 
groups, pure cash-benefit contracts can provide no insurance within the eligible population. 
7For simplicity, we ignore any second-best considerations that might arise from the interaction between 




 is the price of good i without any benefit program.
 i i 
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Marginally increasing the subsidy rate while at the same time decreasing the cash benefit in
 
order to maintain the same program budget implies the following change in the cash benefit:
 
∂b(σ, B) dxX (σ; θ) 
= − xX (σ; θ)p 0 + (σp0 ) f(θ)dθX X∂σ dσ �Θ � �� � 
0 
� dxX (σ; θ) 
= − EΘ xX (σ; θ)pX + EΘ (σp0 .X ) dσ 
The cash benefit must fall by the increase in average per-eligible spending on the in-kind 
benefit (subsidy). Average spending on the subsidy is the sum of two terms: (i) the mechan­
ical increase in spending on the subsidy due to the increase in the subsidy rate, holding fixed 
each type’s consumption of X, EΘ (xX (σ; θ)p0 ) (“mechanical effect”); and (ii) the increase X 
in spending on the subsidy due to the induced change in consumption of X in response to o c 
)dxX (σ;θ)the shift in program benefits, EΘ (σp0 dσ (“behavioral effect”).
8 
X 
2.2.1 The net ex-post value for each type of a shift toward in-kind provision 
For each type, the net ex-post value of the change in the program is the benefit of the increase 
in the subsidy on X (i.e., the benefit from the reduction in the after-subsidy price of X) less 
the cost of the reduction in the cash benefit. A marginal increase in the subsidy rate on X 
reduces the after-subsidy price of X by pX 
0 . The value (in units of income) of this reduction 
in the price of X to an individual of type θ is, by the envelope theorem (Roy’s identity), 
∂v(p(σ),m(σ,B);θ) dpX (σ) 




where v(p(σ),m(σ, B); θ) is the indirect utility function of type θ and m(σ, B) = m0 +b(σ, B) 
is benefit-inclusive income. This benefit from a lower after-subsidy price of X must be 
weighed against the reduction in the cash benefit required to hold fixed total spending on 
the program. Combining these two elements gives the net value (in units of income) of a 
8The “behavioral effect” can be positive or negative, though in most cases it will be positive. It embeds 
the income effects from the reduction in cash benefits, which tend to reduce the consumption of X (provided 
X is normal), and substitution and income effects from the reduction in the after-subsidy price of X, which 
tend to increase consumption of X. A shift toward in-kind provision increases average consumption of X 
unless income effects of demand for X are much larger among those who lose from the shift than among 
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� �
budget-neutral marginal shift toward in-kind benefits of
 
dv(p(σ),m(σ,B);θ) ∂v(p(σ),m(σ,B);θ) dpX (σ) ∂v(p(σ),m(σ,B);θ) ∂b(σ,B)

dV (σ; θ) ∂pX dσ + ∂m ∂σ
 ≡ dσ = 
∂v(p(σ),m(σ,B);θ) ∂v(p(σ),m(σ,B);θ)dσ 
∂m ∂m 
dxX (σ; θ) 
= xX (σ; θ)p 
0 − xX (σ; θ)p 0 + (σp0 ) f(θ)dθX X X dσΘ � 
0 0 
�� dxX (σ; θ) 
= − (σp0 . (1)xX (σ; θ)pX − EΘ xX (σ; θ)pX X )EΘ dσ 
The marginal net value for an individual of type θ of a budget-neutral marginal shift in ben­
efits toward in-kind benefits is the net benefit of the resulting redistribution to his type (re­
distribution benefit), [xX (σ; θ)p0 X − EΘ (xX (σ; θ)p0 X )] , which is greater for types with greater 
levels of demand for X, less the average marginal distortion cost from the induced change o c 
dxX (σ;θ)in consumption of X (distortion cost), (σp0 )EΘ .X dσ 
Equation 1 shows that the shift toward in-kind provision has two key effects. It redistributes 
toward people with above-average demand for the good, and it distorts consumption of the 
good. The extent to which a particular type gains from a marginal shift toward greater in-
kind provision is increasing in that type’s level of consumption of the good and decreasing in 
the average sensitivity of the demand for the good in the population. Absent heterogeneity in 
the consumption of X, all types lose from the shift toward in-kind provision. More generally, 
a marginal shift toward in-kind provision makes all types worse off (a Pareto worsening) if 
heterogeneity in the consumption of X is small enough relative to the distortion caused by 
the subsidy that any redistribution gain enjoyed by high-X types is more than offset by the 
reduction in the cash benefit due to the distortion. 
2.2.2 The net ex-ante value of a shift toward in-kind provision 
Ex-ante expected utility is 
max EU(σ) = v(p(σ),m(σ, B); θ)f(θ)dθ. 
σ Θ 
The total derivative of expected utility with respect to the in-kind component σ (adjusting 
the cash component b in order to hold fixed total program spending) is: 
dEU(σ) dv(p(σ),m(σ, B); θ) dV (σ; θ) dV (σ; θ) 
= f(θ)dθ = λ(σ; θ) f(θ)dθ = EΘ λ(σ; θ)
dσ dσ dσ dσΘ Θ � 
0 
� dxX (σ; θ) 
= CovΘ λ(σ; θ), xX (σ; θ)pX − (σp0 X )EΘ (λ(σ; θ)) EΘ , (2)dσ 
10
 
where λ(σ; θ) is the marginal utility of income.
 
Equation 2 shows the key roles of heterogeneity in the level of demand for X and the 
sensitivity of the demand for X to the composition of benefits in determining the welfare 
consequences of in-kind provision. The extent of heterogeneity in the demand for X and the 
extent to which this heterogeneity is correlated with marginal utility together determine the 
targeting benefit of in-kind provision. The greater is the covariance across types in marginal 
utility and the demand for X, the greater is the targeting benefit of in-kind provision. The 
sensitivity of the demand for X to the composition of benefits determines the distortion cost 
of in-kind provision. The greater is the sensitivity of the demand for X to the composition 
of benefits, the greater is the distortion cost of in-kind provision.9 
3	 Long-Term Care Risk and Financing and the Design 
of Home Care Benefits 
Chronic health problems are the source of one of the most important risks people face over 
the life cycle. Most people will at some point develop functional limitations and require 
significant, time-intensive assistance with activities such as bathing, eating, dressing, and 
managing their household. Roughly 15 percent of Americans over age 50 have at least one 
functional limitation and at least one person helping them as a result.10 People deal with 
their functional limitations in a wide variety of ways. Among people receiving help, the 
vast majority (87 percent) live in the community; only 13 percent live in nursing facilities, 
mostly nursing homes. Among those living in the community, most (72 percent) receive only 
informal care from family and friends, 10 percent receive a mix of formal and informal care, 
and only 4 percent rely exclusively on formal home care. (We will refer to formal home 
care as “formal care” and to informal home care as “informal care.”) Of all hours care, 64 
percent are informal care, 10 percent are formal home care, and 27 percent are from care-
giving facilities. The costs of such care are quite large. In 2008, total spending on formal 
long-term care was $203 billion, with one-third going to home and community based services 
9Appendix A analyzes the optimal mix of in-kind and cash benefits. Absent heterogeneity in the demand 
for X, the optimal policy is a pure cash benefit with no subsidy on X, (b = B, σ = 0). Absent any 
consumption distortion, the in-kind benefit simply redistributes resources across different types (as defined 
by their level of demand for X), at no efficiency cost. In this case, the optimal policy eliminates the covariance 
between marginal utility and the demand for X. If the demand for X is at least somewhat elastic, by contrast, 
the optimal policy trades off the insurance benefit of increasing in-kind provision against the distortion cost. 
In most cases it will stop short of eliminating the covariance between marginal utility and the demand for 
X, since at the margin there would be only a distortion cost and no targeting benefit. 




(Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2010). The cost of informal care is estimated 
to be no less than 60 percent of, and is often thought to exceed, the cost of formal care (e.g., 
Arno et al., 1999). 
Although the costs of dealing with chronic health problems are highly uncertain and some­
times quite large, much of these costs are uninsured. In many countries, universal health 
insurance programs (like Medicare in the U.S.) do not cover long-term care. Yet markets for 
private long-term care insurance are uniformly small. In the U.S., just 10 percent of people 
65 and older own private long-term care insurance, and coverage rates are similarly low in 
other countries. The large costs of long-term care together with the low rates of insurance 
leads to a situation in which means-tested government programs play a major role in fi­
nancing long-term care costs. In the U.S., for example, the means-tested Medicaid program 
covers at least part of the costs of 70 percent of nursing home residents at any point in time 
(Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2013). 
Medicaid also plays a major role in financing home care. In most states, Medicaid provides 
home care primarily through two programs: the Medicaid Title XIX PCS optional State 
plan and the Medicaid 1915(c) HCBS waiver program. Eligibility is based primarily upon 
financial means tests and an assessment of the individual’s “need” for home care based on 
her health.11 Medicaid home care programs have grown rapidly in recent years. In 1999, 1.9 
million people received home care through Medicaid; by 2013, that number had increased to 
nearly 3 million. In addition to the growing number of participants, the fraction of Medicaid 
long-term care dollars that go to home care has risen from 18 percent in 1995 to 51 percent 
in 2014 (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2016). 
Traditionally, government and private long-term care insurance programs have provided in-
kind formal care benefits (including subsidies on formal care) to people who meet health-
and sometimes financial-related eligibility criteria.12 But in recognition of the importance 
of informal care and other means of dealing with chronic health problems, many programs 
have shifted toward more flexible, cash-like benefits. These programs tend to allow people to 
spend their benefits on a much wider array of options than just the traditional formal care, 
often including paying family and friends for informal care, and at the extreme including 
11Medicaid is financed jointly by the federal and state governments, so Medicaid policies vary somewhat 
across states. For the elderly, the means tests for Medicaid home care are often less restrictive than those 
for general Medicaid coverage. The majority of states provide coverage for individuals with incomes up to 
300 percent of the monthly Supplemental Security Income amount (LeBlanc et al., 2001). The amount of 
Medicaid home care for which an individual qualifies is determined by a medical exam. The applicant’s 
health care provider must submit a care plan that details the services deemed appropriate based on the 
applicant’s health status. Summaries of Medicaid-provided home care services are available in LeBlanc et al. 
(2001) and Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured (2011). 
12Many programs, for example, offer benefits to people who have limitations with at least two activities 
of daily living. 
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anything that a recipient wishes to purchase, whether care-related or not. Germany, France, 
Italy, Austria, Sweden, and the Netherlands all have long-term care programs that either 
pay benefits in cash or allow recipients to choose between cash and in-kind benefits (Da 
Roit and Le Bihan, 2010). In the U.S., many state Medicaid home care programs provide 
flexible, cash-like benefits, including 15 states with “Cash and Counseling” programs (Doty 
et al., 2010). Early versions of the Affordable Care Act included a voluntary, long-term care 
insurance program in which individuals meeting health-related eligibility criteria would have 
received a daily cash benefit. 
The shift toward more flexible, cash-like benefits is motivated by the perception, supported by 
a range of evidence, that many people with chronic health problems would much prefer a cash 
transfer to a cost-equivalent in-kind transfer of formal care. An important milestone in the 
debate about more- vs. less- flexible benefits was the Cash and Counseling demonstrations. 
These were large-scale experiments run by three state Medicaid programs around the year 
2000. The experiments randomized participants between the traditional in-kind formal home 
care benefit and an alternative more flexible, cash-like benefit that allowed recipients to spend 
the benefit on a wide range of care-related goods and services, including paying relatives or 
friends for providing care. 
The main goal of the Cash and Counseling experiments was to test whether recipients could 
effectively manage their cash benefits and receive “enough” care. The results were almost 
uniformly positive. Members of the cash-benefit treatment group reported greater satisfac­
tion with their care (Foster et al., 2003) and had similar health outcomes; if anything, their 
health outcomes appeared to be slightly better than those of the traditional in-kind benefit 
group (Lepidus Carlson et al., 2007). In the official final report on the experiments, Brown 
et al. (2007) conclude that the cash transfer has overwhelmingly positive effects on recipients. 
The large body of work evaluating the Cash and Counseling experiments demonstrates quite 
conclusively that more flexible, cash-like benefits can be much more valuable to recipients 
than traditional in-kind benefits. This points to an important cost of providing home care 
benefits in kind: The consumption distortion from in-kind provision appears to be large in 
this context. 
Although much is known about the consumption distortion from in-kind provision of Med­
icaid home care benefits, little is known about the potential benefits of in-kind provision, 
whether for Medicaid home care or for other programs more generally (Currie and Gahvari, 
2008). In-kind provision can have a variety of effects in addition to distorting consumption, 
including changing the distribution of benefits among those eligible for benefits. This could 
significantly increase targeting efficiency, especially in the many contexts in which state veri­
fication is particularly costly. Yet little is known about the likely magnitude of such benefits. 
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This is the gap we aim to fill in this paper.
 
In the context of long-term care, the diversity of ways in which people cope with chronic 
health problems and the large role of informal care may raise important challenges for in­
suring this risk. Hard-to-verify heterogeneity in the costs of coping with chronic health 
problems—which may arise from hard-to-verify differences in health status or in would-be 
care-givers’ opportunity costs of providing informal care—seem likely to cause heterogeneity 
in marginal utility and in the demand for formal care. In a second-best setting in which 
this heterogeneity is not verifiable, insurance programs cannot make different cash transfers 
to people on the basis of their coping costs. Any redistribution from people with lower to 
higher coping costs must instead come through changes in prices. A potentially worthwhile 
distortion might be to subsidize formal care. Everyone in the same market faces the same 
price of formal care, which makes formal care consumption a potentially good “meter” of 
the total costs of bad health (of which formal care is only a part). A formal care subsidy 
therefore tends to redistribute to people with larger coping costs at the cost of distorting 
consumption. As discussed in Section 2, two of the main determinants of the desirability of 
such a subsidy are the distribution of formal care consumption and the sensitivity of formal 
care demand to the composition of benefits. We now turn to estimating these objects. 
4	 Sensitivity of the Demand for Formal Care to the 
Composition of Benefits 
Estimations of the demand for formal care confront an especially challenging simultaneity 
problem. As always, estimating the slope of demand requires an instrument that shifts supply 
but not demand. The key challenge in the case of formal care is that many factors that shift 
supply are also likely to shift demand by changing the opportunity cost of informal care. 
For example, consider using minimum wage laws (or their changes over time) as instruments 
for the price of formal care. Many formal home care workers earn roughly the minimum 
wage, so changes in the minimum wage are likely to shift the supply of formal care. But at 
the same time, changes in the minimum wage are also likely to change the opportunity cost 
of informal care-giving by changing the wage or employment prospects of some potential 
informal care-givers. Changes in the supply of informal care likely shift the demand for 
formal care since formal care and informal care are closely-related goods. The close links 
between formal care and informal care make it especially difficult to find valid instruments 
for the supply of formal care. 
We circumvent this identification issue by taking advantage of the randomization in the Cash 
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and Counseling experiments. People randomized to the cash benefit face the market price 
of formal care, whereas people randomized to the traditional Medicaid program face a price 
of zero.13 Moreover, the price variation from the experiment is not only exogenous to the 
demand for formal care, it also spans the full range of prices most relevant for policy, from 
the market price down to zero. 
The Cash and Counseling experiments were conducted by the Medicaid programs of Arkansas, 
Florida, and New Jersey. Participants were enrolled beginning in 1998 in Arkansas, in 1999 
in New Jersey, and in 2000 in Florida. In New Jersey and Florida, only people who had been 
receiving Medicaid home care were eligible for the experiment, whereas in Arkansas anyone 
who was eligible for Medicaid home care could enroll. Although the exact implementations 
of the experiment differed somewhat between the three states, each shared the same basic 
features. After completing a baseline survey, participants were randomly assigned to one of 
two equal-sized groups. Members of the control group remained subject to the rules of the 
traditional, in-kind Medicaid home care program. Members of the treatment group were 
given cash budgets that could be spent on a wide range of personal care goods and services, 
including assistive devices, home modifications, and, most important, informal care from 
family or friends. Although the benefit had to be spent on personal care services, for many 
recipients it was likely to be equivalent to a pure cash transfer, since the vast majority of 
recipients had been receiving enough informal care at baseline to more than exhaust the 
budget they received from Medicaid.14 
We use data from the nine-month follow-up survey for respondents who were at least 65 
years old and who had non-missing data on their demographics (age, gender, race, and 
educational attainment) and self-rated health. Our sample contains 860 participants from 
Arkansas (428 in the cash group), 482 in Florida (245 in the cash group), and 604 in New 
Jersey (312 in the cash group). Table 1 provides summary statistics. At baseline, average 
formal care consumption ranged from 8 (Arkansas) to 16 (New Jersey) hours per week, and 
on average participants had two informal caregivers. The remaining rows of Table 1 show 
that the treatment and control groups are balanced on demographics such as gender, age, 
race, and education. Although non-negligible fractions of the treatment and control group 
Appendix B.2 presents evidence that the marginal value of Medicaid formal care is zero for most 
recipients of the traditional in-kind benefit. It also tests the robustness of the estimated price sensitivity to 
alternative assumptions about the marginal value of Medicaid formal care. 
14 Recipients had to submit receipts documenting that they spent their benefits on personal care services, 
though they were also allowed to spend up to 10 percent of their allowance on services that could not 
be readily invoiced (e.g., payments to a neighbor for mowing the lawn). The cash allowances received by 
members of the treatment group were slightly smaller than those that would have enabled them to purchase 
the care they would have received under the traditional Medicaid program. This is mainly because of a 
requirement that the experimental cash treatment be budget-neutral. This requirement meant that the 





attrited from the experiment before the nine-month follow-up survey (20 and 35 percent 
of treatment and control group members, respectively), the attrition did not lead to any 
apparent imbalance between the treatment and control groups in terms of observables. Of 
the 30 balance tests, none of the differences between treatment and control groups are 
statistically distinguishable from zero at the 5 percent level and only two are significant at 
the 10 percent level. These are fewer significant differences than would be expected to arise 
by chance without any differential attrition. 
A simple measure of the sensitivity of the demand for formal care to the composition of 
benefits is the difference in average formal care consumption by people randomized into cash 
versus in-kind benefits. Table 3 makes this comparison. On average, people randomized 
to in-kind benefits consumed over twice as much formal care as people randomized to cash 
benefits: 14.8 versus 7.1 hours per week. Similarly large differences occured in each state. 
Figure 2 shows the empirical cumulative distribution functions of formal care consumption 
by the in-kind and cash groups. The distributions have two key features. First, formal care 
consumption by the in-kind group is greater throughout the distribution. Second, many 
people consume no formal care, especially in the cash group. Whereas about one-fifth of the 
in-kind group consumes no formal care, over half of the cash group consumes no formal care. 
Receiving cash as opposed to in-kind benefits leads many people to a corner solution in which 
they consume no formal care. The prevalence of people consuming no care means that the 
observed mean differences between the two groups tend to understate the price sensitivity 
of demand. Overall, these simple comparisons suggest that the demand for formal care is 
quite sensitive to the composition of benefits. 
The slope of the demand curve is not simply the ratio of the observed difference in average 
quantities to the difference in prices for two reasons. First, as just discussed, many individuals 
consume zero hours of care. We account for this by treating an individual’s observed hours 
of care, qi, as the outcome of a censored, latent demand for care, qi = max{0, q ∗}. Second,i 
some of the participants in the cash group reverted to traditional Medicaid home care, and 
some of the participants in both groups left Medicaid home care altogether. The differences 
in Table 3 therefore correspond to intent-to-treat parameters rather than direct measures of 
price sensitivity. We handle this issue by instrumenting for the price each participant faces 
with her randomized assignment.15 We estimate the system 
qi 
∗ = α + βpi + Xiγ + εi 
qi = max{0, q ∗ }i 
15For individuals who leave Medicaid home care or are in the cash group, the price they face is the market 
price in their state. For individuals who are in the traditional Medicaid home care program, the price they 
face is zero. 
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pi = µ0 + µ1Cashi + Xiµ2 + νi, 
where pi is the price of formal care, Cash is an indicator of whether the participant was 
randomized to the cash treatment, and Xi includes indicators for gender, education level, 
race, self-rated health, five-year age bins, and state. We begin by assuming (εi, νi) are jointly 
normal and estimate this system using an instrumental variables Tobit specification. 
The first-stage results are presented in Table 4. On average, being assigned to the cash group 
increases the price of formal care by $8.84, 64 percent of the average market price of $13.73. 
The point estimate is fairly precise and the first-stage relationship is strong; the F-statistic 
exceeds 1,000, well above the levels at which weak instruments become a concern (Stock and 
Yogo, 2002). As one would expect given the random assignment, adding control variables 
has little effect on the estimated relationship between treatment assignment and the price 
of care (column (2)). 
The instrumental variables estimate of β is presented in Table 5. The estimate implies that 
a one dollar increase in the hourly price of formal care reduces consumption by 1.8 hours 
per week. Evaluated at the sample means, this implies an elasticity near -1.2. When the 
demographic controls are added to the specification (column (2)), the estimate is virtually 
unchanged. 
This price sensitivity suggests that formal care subsidies could potentially significantly in­
crease consumption of formal care, as many people who otherwise without subsidies would 
have relied more heavily on informal care substitute toward formal care. This also suggests 
that subsidizing formal care may have large moral hazard costs. For someone consuming the 
average amount of formal care among people randomized to traditional in-kind benefits (14 
hours per week), the ex-post deadweight loss from in-kind provision is about 72 percent of 
Medicaid’s spending on the individual’s care.16 For someone consuming 25 hours of formal 
care per week, the deadweight loss from in-kind provision is about 49 percent of Medicaid’s 
spending on the individual’s care. More generally, and as discussed in Section 2, the ex-post 
deadweight loss as a fraction of Medicaid spending is decreasing in the level of demand for 
care. 
In Appendix B.2, we analyze the consequences for the estimated price sensitivity of making 
a wide range of alternative assumptions about the distribution of the error terms and limits 
on how much Medicaid home care recipients of the traditional in-kind benefit can consume. 
The conclusion that the demand for formal care is quite sensitive to its price is robust to a 
wide range of alternative assumptions. 
16With a price sensitivity of -1.8, someone consuming 14 hours of care per week has an equivalent variation 
of formal care benefits (assuming no income effects) of $54 per week, or 28 percent of Medicaid’s $192 of 
spending on that care (14 hours per week at an average price of $13.73 per hour). 
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Also in Appendix B.2, we discuss the generalizability of the estimates of the demand for 
formal care based on the Cash and Counseling experiments to other policies and populations 
of interest. There are two key issues. First, selection into the experiment likely means that 
the average participant in Cash and Counseling was more price sensitive than the average 
recipient of Medicaid home care and potentially either more or less price sensitive than the 
average person in the population of people eligible for Medicaid home care. Second, the 
nature of the experiment—especially its unexpected nature and uncertain duration—seems 
likely to lead to smaller quantity responses than one would expect from permanent changes 
in policies. Although these are important issues for generalizability, the benefits of the large, 
exogenous variation in the price of formal care make the Cash and Counseling experiments 
an important source of evidence on the demand for formal care. In light of the possible issues 
with generalizability, however, in the policy analysis (Section 5) we test the robustness of 
our results to a wide range of values of the price sensitivity. 
5 Heterogeneity in the Demand for Formal Care 
In this section, we estimate the heterogeneity in the demand for formal care and assess the 
extent to which it is correlated with observables that could potentially serve as tags.17 We 
do this using the 1999 wave of the National Long Term Care Survey (NLTCS). The NLTCS 
is a nationally representative sample of Medicare enrollees, including people in care-giving 
institutions such as nursing homes. It is designed to provide information on the health and 
functional status of Americans who are at least 65 years old. We focus on people with at 
least two activities of daily living limitations who are living in the community because this 
is the population of interest for home care benefits programs. The data include informa­
tion on formal care consumption, income, physical limitations, and a host of demographic 
characteristics. 
Heterogeneity in formal care consumption implies, holding other resources fixed, heterogene­
ity in non-care consumption, which in many models implies heterogeneity in the marginal 
utility of wealth. Figure 3 shows the empirical cumulative distribution function of formal 
care hours. There are two important features of this distribution. First, many people do not 
consume any formal care—approximately 62 percent of the sample. Second, there is a long 
right tail of people who consume large amounts of care. Conditional on consuming any care, 
median consumption is 14 hours of care per week, whereas the 95th percentile is 168 hours 
17In principle, even a characteristic that is uncorrelated with formal care consumption could be a valuable 
tag. Any characteristic that is predictive of higher moments of the distribution of formal care would be 




of care per week.
 
To the extent that an insurance program can condition transfers on verifiable characteristics, 
the observed heterogeneity in Figure 3 overstates the relevant heterogeneity for the insurance 
program. For instance, many Medicaid home care programs require that an individual have 
at least two activities of daily living limitations to be eligible. Figure 4 plots the CDFs of 
formal care for people with fewer than two activities of daily living limitations and for people 
with at least two limitations. There is a clear difference in care use across the two groups; 
the number of activities of daily living limitations explains some of the variation in care use. 
But a large amount of heterogeneity remains even within these groups. 
We turn to assessing the extent to which the heterogeneity in formal care can be explained 
by observable characteristics. We do so by regressing measures of formal care consumption 
on a set of observable characteristics that could be correlated with the demand for care. 
First, we run a probit regression of whether someone uses formal care as a function of 
age, indicators for her number of activities of daily living limitations (omitted group is 
two limitations), indicators for her self-rated health (omitted category is excellent), gender, 
whether she lives alone, whether she has children, and linear and quadratic terms for her 
income. The marginal effects from this regression are presented in column (1) of Table 6. 
Age, activities of daily living limitations, self-rated health, and living alone are all strongly 
associated with whether someone consumes formal care. In the second column, we present 
results of an OLS regression of hours of care per week on observables for the set of people 
who consume positive amounts of care. Physical limitations, gender, and whether the person 
lives alone are important predictors of care use among those consuming some formal care. In 
the third column, we use our estimates of the price sensitivity of demand for formal care to 
“correct” for differences in the prices people face and find similar results.18 The next three 
columns display results where state fixed effects have been included in each specification. 
The results closely mirror those without the state fixed effects. 
For understanding the targeting properties of potential tags, it is important to understand 
not only the extent to which observable characteristics predict differences in mean consump­
tion but also how much of the variation they explain. Table 7 reports McFadden’s pseudo 
R-squared statistics for the probits and standard R-squared statistics for the ordinary least 
squares regressions of formal care use on observed characteristics. The columns correspond 
to the same sets of analyses presented in Table 6, but the rows now indicate which vari­
ables have been added to the set of controls. The set of variables is cumulative so each 
row includes all of the previous rows’ controls as well.19 The observables predict a moder­
18Specifically, we subtract 1.8 times the market price for care from each individual’s observed care use 
except for those who face a price of zero, i.e. those on Medicaid. 
19“Health controls” variables are age, indicators for the number of activities of daily living limitations, 
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ate amount of the variation in care use—between 7 and 28 percent—but leave most of the 
variation “unexplained.”20 
Taken together, these analyses suggest two main conclusions. First, there is a large amount of 
heterogeneity in the demand for care that cannot be explained by observable characteristics 
in the NLTCS. This implies that even if it were possible to condition insurance benefits 
on all of these characteristics at reasonable administrative and moral hazard costs, there 
would remain important residual heterogeneity that could potentially be targeted with in-
kind formal care benefits. Second, certain observable characteristics, especially the number 
of activities of daily living limitations and whether the individual lives alone, are associated 
with large differences in care use on average. Such characteristics could potentially serve as 
tags to target benefits to desired recipients. 
To get a rough sense of the potential scope for targeting benefits, we estimate the fraction of 
people eligible for Medicaid home care who actually take up benefits. As discussed in Section 
2, in-kind transfers differentially transfer resources to high-demand types even when take-up 
is 100 percent. But to the extent that taking up benefits is costly, some targeting may occur 
on the extensive margin, as people with relatively low demand may not choose to join the 
program. Take-up rates are therefore an important metric of the extent to which providing 
benefits in kind targets transfers to high-demand types. Among people eligible for Medicaid 
home care, we estimate that between 4 percent and 16 percent actually take up benefits.21 
The low take-up rate means that, holding fixed total spending on the program, benefits 
per recipient are between 6 and 24 times greater than they would be under a hypothetical 
program with 100 percent take up. Applying these ratios to participants in the Cash and 
Counseling experiments, a hypothetical program with 100 percent take up would transfer 
indicators for self-rated health categories, and gender. “Informal care options” variables include whether the 
individual lives alone and whether she has children. 
20The variance in formal care consumption understates the variance in the demand for formal care because 
consumption must be non-negative; variance in consumption does not capture heterogeneity among people 
who do not consume any care. As a result, this analysis tends to overstate the fraction of the variance in 
the demand for formal care “explained by” these observables. 
21Estimating take-up rates for Medicaid home care, and Medicaid more generally, is notoriously difficult 
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1992). Eligibility rules are complex, vary from state-to­
state, and often depend upon household characteristics that are unobservable to the researcher. We use the 
NLTCS to estimate the fraction of the elderly who are eligible for benefits, based on the eligibility criteria 
from Schneider et al. (1999). We combine that estimate with the size of the sixty-five and older population 
and administrative estimates of the number of Medicaid home care users from LeBlanc et al. (2001). The 
main source of uncertainty in our estimated take-up rate (from four to 16 percent) is the incompleteness of 
the information on household assets in the NLTCS. In all cases, a person must have at least two activities of 
daily living limitations. The upper end of our range, 16 percent take-up, should be interpreted as an upper 
bound on the take-up rate because we imposed (much) more restrictive income and asset requirements than 
the actual limits in the vast majority of states. In particular, we imposed that the household earned no 
more than 100 percent of the SSI benefit and had no cars (car value is one of the primary inputs to the 
asset tests). Our least restrictive eligibility threshold uses the income limits from Schneider et al. (1999) and 
imposes that the household have fewer than two cars. 
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to each recipient the dollar value of just 0.6 to 2.3 hours of care per week rather than the 
14 hours of care per week recipients actually received. This reinforces the conclusion that 
providing home care benefits in kind may have important targeting effects. 
Whether this targeting of benefits to a subset of the eligible population is desirable depends 
on the nature of selection into the program and the planner’s objective function. Table 8 
shows summary statistics on the characteristics of the population that is eligible for Medicaid 
home care broken into those who do and those who do not actually take up the in-kind 
benefits. Individuals who take up Medicaid home care have significantly greater physical 
disabilities, less education, and are less likely to have a spouse who can provide informal 
care. Even after conditioning on the observable indicators of wealth and health status used by 
Medicaid to determine eligibility, there remains substantial variation in functional limitations 
and availability of informal care options, and people who actually take up Medicaid home 
care benefits appear to be in worse health and have less good informal care options than 
eligibles who do not take up benefits. 
The significant heterogeneity in formal care consumption among people with the same ob­
servable characteristics, the low take-up rate of traditional Medicaid home care, and the 
observable differences between those who take up traditional Medicaid home care and the 
broader population of people eligible for the program all suggest that providing home care 
benefits in kind may have important targeting benefits. 
6 Policy Analysis 
In this section we adapt an approach from the literature on optimal taxation to evaluate the 
welfare consequences of alternative home care benefit programs. We consider programs that 
combine a formal care subsidy with a cash benefit component. As discussed in Section 2, 
the key determinants of the welfare consequences of in-kind provision of formal care are the 
distribution of demand for care, the sensitivity of the demand for care to the composition of 
benefits, and the link between marginal utility and the demand for care. The key source of 
heterogeneity is in the demand for formal care, which may be driven by hard-to-verify het­
erogeneity in health status, informal care options, or abilities to cope with health problems. 
We also test the robustness of the results to different assumptions about how unverifiable 





6.1 Model and parameterization 
Individuals draw their type from a distribution of types, θ ∼ F (θ). Then they choose their 
formal care consumption and non-care consumption to maximize utility subject to a budget 
constraint that depends on the policy in operation. The budget constraint is 
A + pF = m, 
where F is formal care consumption, A is non-care consumption (i.e., “all other goods,” the 
numeraire), p is the after-subsidy price of formal care, and m is benefit-inclusive nominal 
income. The utility function and the corresponding demand for care are 
(max{α, 0} − F )2 
U(A, F ; θ) = u A − ,
2β 
F (p, m; θ) = max {0, min {m/p, α − βp}} . 
α is the quantity of care at which the individual is satiated, i.e., the amount of care the 
individual would consume when facing a price of zero. β determines the utility cost of 
consuming levels of care other than the satiation level and thereby determines the sensitivity 
of the demand for formal care to the composition of benefits. F (p, m; θ) is the Marshallian 
demand function for formal care. 
This utility function is motivated by key evidence from our setting. It produces a simple 
function for the demand for formal care that is consistent with the sensitivity of formal 
care consumption to its price and that people become satiated at finite levels of formal 
care consumption.22 This utility function also has several appealing features. It nests as 
a special case the widely-used model in which health spending is equivalent to a wealth 
shock.23 It implies that the demand for formal care is linear in its price within the range of 
prices in which the individual is not at a corner. It has an intuitive interpretation: Utility 
is decreasing in any unmet, residual health needs, (α − F ), the size of which is decreasing 
22The most direct evidence of satiation is that among Cash and Counseling participants with information 
on their care plan hours, 43 percent consumed less care than they were entitled to based on their care plan. 
Intuitively, satiation might arise from a demand for privacy or space, since home care involves close contact 
with caregivers in one’s home. This utility function is also consistent with the fact that most people who 
need assistance do not consume any formal care. This implies that there is no Inada condition on formal 
care consumption and that formal care is not too complementary with other goods that people consume. 
23As β approaches 0, formal care consumption approaches α (F (p, m; θ) → α, ignoring corner solutions), 
and the indirect utility function approaches v(p, m; θ) = u(m−pα). For β > 0, demand for formal care is sen­⎧ o c 
m − max{α,0}
2⎨ u , if α < βp;2βo csitive to its price and the indirect utility function is v(p, m; θ) = ⎩ u m − p(α − βp) − βp2 , if α ≥ βp.2 
This differs from the benchmark case in which health spending is a wealth shock by just a slight adjustment, 




in formal care consumption, F , and increasing in the level of demand for formal care, α. 
This captures the idea that certain health problems are costly for people to cope with on 
their own. Such costs create a demand for formal care, which reduces the utility costs of 
bad health. The greater is the price of formal care, the less of it that people will consume, 
and so the greater will be the residual utility costs of coping with health problems left over 
after formal care consumption. Marginal utility of income depends on the demand for formal 
care mainly through the budget constraint: Greater spending on formal care means lower 
non-care consumption. The key assumption is that formal care is not a good substitute for 
non-care consumption as a whole. 
To better understand the nature of the risk that people face and the desired insurance 






α,0}2 , if α < βp;
b(θ; B) = 
b(B) + p(α − βp) + βp
2 
2 
, if α ≥ βp, 
where B is average per-person spending on people eligible for home care benefits and b(B) 
is the cash transfer that makes total program spending equal B. The first-best transfer is 
increasing in α, first quadratically then linearly. With these transfers, indirect utility is 
vFB(p, m, B; θ) = u (m + b(B)) , 
which is independent of θ. The first-best contract does not distort consumption, and it fully 
insures all risk. By making larger transfers to people with larger demands for formal care, it 
fully compensates people for their expenditures on formal care and any residual utility costs 
they face from coping with their health problems. 
6.2 Parameter values 
Everyone has the same price sensitivity of demand for care, β. The only heterogeneity is in 
the level of demand for care, α. For the price sensitivity of demand for formal care, we use 
our main estimate from the Cash and Counseling experiment, β̂ = 1.8. This estimate implies 
that every $1 increase in the hourly price of formal care reduces formal care consumption 
by 1.8 hours per week. We test the robustness of the results to a wide range of alternative 
values. 
We use β̂ to convert the joint distribution of formal care consumption and formal care prices 
observed in the NLTCS into a distribution of the level of demand for formal care, F (α). 
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For the analysis that takes as given standard eligibility criteria for home care benefits, our 
sample is everyone aged 65 and older with at least two activities of daily living limitations. 
For the tags analysis, we estimate separate F (α) distributions for each sub-group of this 
population as defined by their tagged characteristics, for example, separately for people with 
different numbers of activities of daily living limitations. Estimating F (α) would be entirely 
straightforward were it not for people who consume no care when facing a positive price—62 
percent of the population of interest. Among people who consume no formal care, revealed-
preference analysis implies only a bound on the level of their demand (that their marginal 
value at zero hours of care is no greater than the price). But because we will be analyzing 
policies that reduce the prices people face, it is important to know at which price each 
individual would begin purchasing care. We handle this fundamental unobservability issue 
by extrapolating the observed distribution among people who consume a strictly positive 
amount of care backward to “fill in” the unobservable α values of people who consume no 
formal care when facing a positive price. Details of this calculation are reported in Appendix 
C. We also test the robustness of the results to a wide range of alternative assumptions about 
this portion of the α distribution. 
Figure 5 presents our main estimate of the distribution of the level of demand for formal 
care, F (α). The key features of this distribution, inherited from the observed distribution 
of formal care consumption, are that it exhibits a long right tail (the mean far exceeds the 
median) and that most of the mass is at low values. The estimates imply that 0 percent 
of people would consume no care even at a price of zero, whereas the observed distribution 
of formal care when people face market prices has 62 percent of its mass at zero hours of 
care.24 The difference comes from the estimated price sensitivity of demand for formal care 
together with the shape of the observed formal care distribution among people who consume 
a strictly positive amount of care when facing market prices. 
We adopt standard values of the remaining parameters. We follow most of the literature on 







(e.g., Brown and Finkelstein, 2008; De Nardi et al., 2010; Ameriks et al., 2011). In our 
model, the argument c is “net consumption,” non-care consumption net of any residual 
coping costs, c = A − (α−
2β
F )2 . We follow Brown and Finkelstein (2008) in taking as a baseline 
value a coefficient of relative risk aversion, γ, of three. Income before transfers, m, is $15,000 
24Someone with αi < 0 would have to be paid in order to consume formal care. The difference between 
αi = 0 and αi < 0 is only relevant for formal care subsidies in excess of 100 percent. Although it might at 
first appear unintuitive that some people would consume no care when facing a zero price, it is important 
to keep in mind the nature of home care. Home care is a specific set of services that are often private and 
sensitive, such as assistance with bathing and using the toilet. Much of it is not just general help around 
the home that even healthy people would value. An important caveat to this analysis is that as formal care 
subsidies increase, the incentive to relabel other services as formal care gets larger. Large enough subsidies 
would presumably have to be accompanied by enforceable limits on the set of services that qualify. 
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per year. The distribution of before-subsidy prices of formal care is the empirical distribution 
observed in the NLTCS. People who cannot achieve net consumption of at least c̄ =$5,000 
per year receive transfers that enable them to enjoy net consumption of $5,000 per year (a 
consumption floor). 
6.3 Optimal formal care subsidy given standard eligibility criteria 
In this section we calculate the optimal subsidy rate on formal care, σ∗, taking as given total 
spending on program benefits and standard eligibility criteria for home care benefits.25 We 
focus on programs that limit eligibility to people with two or more activities of daily living 
limitations. This follows standard practice for Medicaid home care and private long-term 
care insurance.26 Everyone who qualifies for home care benefits automatically receives the 
same cash benefit and the same subsidy rate on their purchases of formal care. These choices 
focus our analysis on the core tradeoff at the heart of in-kind provision. We consider policies 
under which total program spending equals the spending on a pure in-kind benefit program, 
a 100 percent subsidy with no cash benefit. Policies with smaller subsidy rates have larger 
cash benefits. 
Figure 6 presents the key result. It shows the equivalent variation of the mixed in-kind and 
cash benefit policy as a function of the in-kind component, the subsidy rate σ. The equivalent 
variation is expressed as the pure cash transfer (identical for everyone who qualifies for home 
care benefits) that would be required to make the individual as well off as she is under the 
mixed-benefit program in question. The optimal subsidy rate is 88 percent, close to a pure 
in-kind program (under which the after-subsidy price is zero). The optimal subsidy increases 
welfare substantially relative to a pure-cash benefit program. In order to make the individual 
as well off as she is with the optimal policy under an alternative pure-cash benefit program, 
the cash benefit would have to be about 80 percent greater than the average cost of the in-kind 
program. Figure 6 also shows, however, that the optimal subsidy is significantly less valuable 
than the hypothetical first-best policy full insurance. The optimal in-kind subsidy achieves 
59 percent of the incremental value over a pure-cash benefit that the first-best policy does. 
Table 7 shows a variety of outcomes for each of several different versions of the model. The 
25The full optimal policy problem also involves choosing the eligibility criteria on which to condition 
benefits (e.g., the program might offer different benefit bundles to people with different numbers of activities 
of daily living limitations) as well as the net transfers across verifiably-distinguishable groups. We address 
these issues in the next section. A socially- (as opposed to just privately-)optimal program would also take 
into account any impacts of the program on real and fiscal externalities, including any effects on the spending 
of consumption-floor programs and on tax revenue. 
26In analyzing formal care subsidies for which some people are not eligible, the impossibility of reselling 




purpose of this table is to provide intuition for and assess the robustness of the key results. 
The first column of the table shows results for the baseline specification just discussed. The 
key tradeoff involved in increasing the in-kind component of the benefit can be seen clearly 
by comparing the average level of and dispersion in non-care consumption under the optimal 
subsidy program and under the cost-equivalent pure-cash benefit program. The optimal 
subsidy reduces average non-care consumption due to the consumption distortion (and to 
a lesser extent due to foregone transfers from the consumption floor), but it also greatly 
reduces the dispersion of non-care consumption, as measured by the standard deviation. 
Under the pure-cash program the standard deviation of annual non-care consumption is 4.5 
times greater than under the optimal program, $5610 vs. $1237. 
Additional rows of the table unpack these results further. They show that formal care 
consumption is significantly greater under the optimal subsidy than in the absence of any 
program, by a factor of 2.4. This translates into a large distortion cost; the total ex-post 
equivalent variation of the optimal program summed over all recipients is only 48 percent of 
the total cost of the program. Part of this is due to the optimal program displacing transfers 
from the consumption floor, but much of it is due to the consumption distortion from the 
formal care subsidy. This amounts to a significant implicit tax on insurance, equivalent to 
a tax of almost 100 percent of benefits. The reason that subsidizing formal care is optimal 
despite the large distortion is that the in-kind subsidy redistributes toward people with 
greater marginal utility. The correlation between an individual’s marginal utility in the 
absence of any program and his ex-post equivalent variation of benefits under the optimal 
program is 0.84. The net benefit from in-kind provision comes from making large transfers 
to the relatively few people with high demand for care (and so low non-care consumption). 
This can be seen in the bottom row of the table, which shows that under the optimal 
subsidy program only 16 percent of people value the subsidy program as much as the cost-
equivalent pure-cash benefit program ex post. This may help explain why many countries 
and U.S. states have made home care benefits more cash-like. Making benefits more cash-like 
helps most individuals ex post, often significantly. A key finding of this paper, however, is 
that the greater ex-post value of more cash-like benefits comes at the expense of much less 
redistribution toward people with high demand for formal care, which may worsen insurance. 
The other columns of the table test the robustness of the results to making different assump­
tions about the key ingredients of the model. The price sensitivity of demand for formal 
care must be quite large—over 10 times larger than we estimate based on evidence from 
the Cash and Counseling experiment—in order to overturn the conclusion that the optimal 
subsidy is large. Even if the distribution of partially-identified α values among people who 
consume no care at positive prices is in the “worst-case” configuration (i.e., each αi equal 
to the maximum value consistent with observed behavior), the optimal subsidy rate is still 
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86 percent.27 The utility function must exhibit strong state dependence of just the right 
kind—greatly decreasing the marginal utility of people with high demand for formal care 
in just the right way28—in order to overcome the fact that, holding other resources con­
stant, people with greater formal care consumption must have lower non-care consumption. 
Although the right tail of the distribution of demand for formal care is an important de­
terminant of the targeting benefit and so the optimal subsidy, the optimal subsidy remains 
large even when the right tail of the distribution is chopped off or when all of the α values 
are scaled down. If people who consume more than 50 hours per week of care are dropped 
from the simulation, the optimal subsidy is 59 percent. If all of the α values are cut in half, 
the optimal subsidy is 75 percent.29 Finally, a combination of relatively low risk aversion 
together with a relatively generous consumption floor can overturn the optimality of a large 
subsidy on formal care, although this reflects the undesirability of any insurance—including 
a first-best contract—in situations in which means-tested programs are sufficiently attractive 
rather than any undesirability of in-kind benefits per se.30 
The alternative specifications, in addition to providing a sense of the robustness of the 
27The intuition for the robustness of the results to the exact shape of the distribution of demand among 
people with a low demand for formal care is that the key driver of the targeting benefit from in-kind 
provision is the shape of the other tail of the formal care distribution: people with high demand for care. 
The distribution of demand among people with a low demand for care matters mainly for determining the 
distortion cost of in-kind provision. 
28Appendix C discusses how different types of state-dependence of utility affect the desirability of providing 
home care benefits in kind. That many private long-term care insurance contracts subsidize the consumption 
of formal care suggests that the correlation between marginal utility without insurance and formal care 
consumption is positive, at least for many of the people who buy these contracts. This suggests that to 
the extent that there is state-dependence of utility, it does not overturn the positive correlation between 
formal care consumption and marginal utility that would tend to arise from the budget constraint alone 
(since greater consumption of formal care reduces the resources available for non-care consumption). 
29This partially addresses possible biases from modeling a dynamic situation in a static model. The static 
nature of the model means that 100 percent of formal care costs must be financed by reducing non-care 
consumption in that period; formal care costs cannot be smoothed over time by saving and borrowing. To 
the extent that shocks are not entirely persistent, this tends to leads us to overstate the welfare cost of 
uninsured risk and so the value of insurance against it. This issue is less relevant for Medicaid home care— 
with its strict asset tests—than for private long-term care insurance. It also addresses possible biases from 
ignoring other risk-sharing arrangements, e.g., informal family insurance. 
30The final column shows that if risk aversion is relatively low (γ = 1) and the consumption floor is 
relatively generous (c̄ = $5, 000), the first-best insurance policy that provides complete insurance without 
distorting consumption is dominated by an alternative uniform pure-cash benefit that provides no insurance 
at all. The reason that even a first-best, actuarially-fair insurance contract is dominated by the no-insurance 
alternative in this case is the high rates of implicit taxation from the consumption floor. Without insur­
ance, the consumption floor pays for much of the care of people with the greatest demand for care. As a 
result, insurance reduces average consumption among the insured by reducing the transfers they receive from 
consumption-floor programs. This is similar to Brown and Finkelstein’s (2008) findings about how Medicaid 
can crowd out purchases of even actuarially fair long-term care insurance by a large part of the wealth 
distribution. It should be noted that while the first-best contract is dominated by no insurance from the 
perspective of people eligible (or potentially eligible) for home care, the first-best contract is better from the 
perspective of society as a whole. From the perspective of society as a whole, the home care benefit should 
internalize any effects alternative home care benefits might have on the rest of society, including government 
or private consumption-floor programs. 
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results, also provide information about the key factors driving the results. As expected, the 
net benefit of subsidizing formal care is decreasing in the price sensitivity of demand for 
formal care. When demand for formal care is completely inelastic (β = 0), a 100 percent 
subsidy achieves the first best.31 The targeting benefit of in-kind provision is increasing in 
risk aversion and decreasing in the generosity of alternative insurance arrangements, such 
as any consumption floor or means-tested programs. The targeting benefit of subsidizing 
formal care is increasing in the extent to which there is state-dependent utility in which 
marginal utility is greater for people with greater demand for formal care (above and beyond 
the effects operating through the budget constraint or residual coping costs). If such state-
dependence is strong enough, it is optimal to more than fully subsidize formal care (columns 
8 and 11). 
Although formal care subsidies significantly increase risk sharing, they (optimally) leave some 
risk uninsured due to the distortion they cause. Both the incompleteness of the insurance 
and the distortion from the subsidy mean that formal care subsidies fall short of achieving 
the first best. In the baseline specification, the optimal subsidy achieves about 83 percent 
of the incremental value over pure-cash benefits of the first-best policy. The shortfall is a 
measure of the potential gain from using a richer set of policies. A natural enrichment is to 
condition benefits on verifiable characteristics—i.e., to use tags,—a possibility to which we 
now turn. 
6.4 Optimal policy with tags 
This section extends the analysis to the case in which different groups of people, defined by 
their verifiable characteristics, can be offered different benefits. We estimate the gains from 
catering benefits to different groups of people defined by the number of activities of daily 
living limitations they have (2–4, 5, and 6) and whether they live alone, the two strongest 
predictors of formal care consumption uncovered in Section 5.32 The procedure is the same as 
that in the last section, except that we estimate different α distributions for different groups 
of people and allow the program to offer different benefits to people in different groups. 
Figures of the α distributions of each group are reported in Appendix C. 
31One caveat about this result is that it is based on a model in which formal care is borderline inferior 
(no income effects). This result need not hold in a more general model with income effects of demand for 
formal care. It is also important to note that the assumption that formal care is borderline inferior tends 
to work against the value of in-kind provision by increasing the consumption distortion. The greater are 
income effects of demand for formal care, the more that the (negative) income effects from subsidizing formal 
care (due to the consumption distortion) offset the inefficient over-consumption of formal care due to the 
substitution effect. 
32We are limited in the number of groups we can split the population into by the size of the NLTCS 
sample. We chose the groups to maximize the across-group heterogeneity in the demand for formal care. 
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Table 7 shows the results. The planner takes advantage of the flexibility offered by tagging 
to redistribute across groups by offering high-demand groups more generous benefits. In the 
case of a tag based on whether someone lives alone, for example, the planner transfers on 
average over two-and-a-half times more to people who live alone than to people who live with 
others. Despite this, however, the ex-ante welfare gain from using these tags is quite small. 
The incremental welfare gain from optimally tagging a pure-cash benefit based on whether 
someone lives alone is $227, just 4 percent of the gain from an optimal untagged mixed 
benefit. The incremental welfare gain from optimally tagging a mixed cash-in-kind benefit 
based on whether someone lives alone is even smaller—just $44. The incremental gains from 
tagging benefits based on the number of activities of daily living limitations someone has 
are smaller still. The fundamental reason for tags’ ineffectiveness in insuring this risk is that 
much of the heterogeneity in demand for formal care occurs within rather than across groups 
that can be distinguished on the basis of their verifiable characteristics. This comes through 
in the correlation between someone’s marginal utility in the absence of any program and 
the optimal tagged pure-cash benefits. This correlation is just 0.2 when whether someone 
lives alone is used as a tag and just 0.05 when someone’s number of activities of daily living 
limitations is used as a tag. 
These results suggest that in the context of homecare, the potential for tags to target transfers 
toward high-marginal utility types is limited. These results are consistent with those of 
Mankiw and Weinzierl (2010) on the effects of using height as a tag for optimal income 
taxation.33 Although different combinations of observable characteristics could potentially 
improve on those we have analyzed here, both the small gains from tags based on two of the 
strongest predictors of formal care consumption and the limited extent to which the full set 
of observable characteristics in the NLTCS predict formal care consumption (as discussed in 
Section 5) suggest that the scope for tags is limited and reinforce the conclusion that in-kind 
benefits have an important role to play in terms of targeting benefits to high-marginal utility 
types. 
6.5 Summary of results 
This analysis is subject to several caveats. It assumes that people’s decisions about con­
sumption are rational. This ignores possible paternalistic rationales for in-kind transfers, 
which could be important in the case of home care given the cognitive health problems from 
which some recipients suffer. Such considerations, which were one of the main motivations 
33In both cases, the optimal tagged transfers are large; the optimal “lives-alone subsidy” is $4790 and 
the optimal “height tax” on someone earning $50,000 is $4,500. But the welfare gains from tagging are a 
small fraction of aggregate income—about 1.5 percent for a “lives-alone subsidy” and about 0.2 percent for 
a “height tax.” 
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for the Cash and Counseling experiments, seem likely to increase the value of in-kind as 
opposed to cash transfers in this context. It assumes that take-up decisions are fully rational 
and abstracts from any costs of taking up. This is done to focus on the core tradeoff at the 
heart of in-kind provision, but it is important to note that many in-kind programs have low 
take-up rates, whether from low knowledge about or high costs of taking up the programs. It 
assumes that all ex-post heterogeneity is the outcome of an exogenous process. This feature, 
which is shared by the vast majority of the large literature on optimal taxation, rules out 
ex-ante moral hazard (effects of policies on the distribution of ex-post types), which tends 
to increase the net value of insurance or redistribution. It focuses only on home care and 
does not explicitly model substitution across other types of care. This was done for sim­
plicity given that there appears to be little substitution across different types of long-term 
care (Grabowski and Gruber, 2007; Kemper, 1988). Finally, it focuses on singles in order 
to avoid the many complexities involved in modeling couples, including any financial risk 
sharing and utility consequences of different caregiving arrangements. An analysis of couples 
and extended families is an interesting topic for future work. 
Acknowledging these caveats, taken as a whole the results suggest that in-kind provision of 
formal care benefits likely increases welfare despite the large distortion it causes. Although 
the distortion cost of this particular means of targeting is large, our results suggest that the 
main alternative means of targeting (using tags) is unlikely to be very effective in this context. 
These conclusions are robust to a wide range of assumptions. The fundamental reasons for 
this robustness are the large extent of hard-to-verify heterogeneity in the demand for formal 
care and the rapid rate at which marginal utility diminishes in the level of consumption 
under standard utility functions (Kaplow, 2011). 
7 Conclusion 
We analyze the consequences of providing formal home care benefits in kind, focusing on 
the targeting benefits and distortion costs. In-kind provision appears to increase welfare 
despite imposing large distortion costs, since the targeting benefits are even larger. The 
key factor driving this result is the significant, hard-to-verify heterogeneity in the demand 
for formal care—whether from hard-to-verify differences in underlying health or in the costs 
of coping with a given set of health problems—which implies significant heterogeneity in 
non-care consumption and so, in many models, in marginal utility. 
Two main caveats are important to keep in mind in interpreting our results. First, the
 
magnitude of the targeting benefit depends crucially on the utility function, particularly
 




provision in the first place. This caveat, common to all questions about the optimal design 
of insurance programs and other policies that redistribute across people, is extremely impor­
tant: Improving our understanding of the mapping between spending on market goods and 
utility is a high priority for future work. Second, we focus only on the potential targeting 
benefit of providing formal care in kind. We do not consider other potential benefits, includ­
ing improving tax system efficiency, alleviating the Samaritan’s dilemma, and paternalistic 
benefits, all of which might be important in this context. These other potential benefits seem 
likely to increase the net value of in-kind provision of formal care, which would reinforce our 
conclusion about the desirability of in-kind provision of formal care. 
Our results have important implications for understanding long-term care risk, private long­
term care insurance markets, and public long-term care insurance programs. Long-term care 
risk, at least the portion of the risk related to home care, appears to feature a combination 
of important hard-to-verify heterogeneity and high price sensitivity, which makes it an es­
pecially difficult risk to insure. Our results imply that even optimally-designed home care 
insurance involves a significant distortion cost, which acts as a large implicit “moral hazard” 
tax on insurance. This implicit tax, together with numerous other factors that have been 
identified in the literature (see Brown and Finkelstein, 2011, for a review), could help explain 
the small size of markets for private long-term care insurance. 
Our results also have important implications for public policies, especially recent policy 
initiatives to make various in-kind benefits more flexible and cash-like. The Medicaid Cash 
and Counseling programs and the short-lived CLASS Act component of what went on to 
become the Affordable Care Act are just two examples among many of “consumer-driven” 
reform proposals that aim to increase the range of options available to benefit recipients. The 
main impetus for these proposals is the view that the consumption distortion from in-kind 
provision is large, a view that is consistent with our analysis of the particular case of Medicaid 
home care benefits. Yet a frequently-overlooked consequence of such reform proposals is 
that, in addition to reducing consumption distortions, such proposals would also tend to 
systematically change the distribution of benefits received by different people. Our analysis 
suggests that although moving toward more cash-like home care benefits would significantly 
reduce consumption distortions, it would also forgo the apparently even larger targeting 
benefits that arise from providing formal care in kind. To the extent that achieving a good 
targeting of benefits in any particular context is difficult or infeasible without distorting 
consumption, as our analysis suggests may be the case in the context of home care, any gain 
from reducing distortions must be weighed against any reduction in targeting efficiency that 
would result. 
The issue of optimal benefit design in government programs is a central one, as many of the 
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most important government programs involve in-kind benefits, including public schooling, 
food stamps, public housing, and Medicare and Medicaid medical benefits. Although home 
care shares much in common with other types of health care, the quantitative magnitudes 
of the key factors determining the desirability of in-kind provision that we emphasize— 
the distribution of demand and the sensitivity of demand to benefit composition—will be 
different in different contexts. It is therefore important to evaluate the costs and benefits 
of alternative benefit designs on a case-by-case basis, and our hope is that the approach we 
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Figure 1: Equivalent variations and excess burdens of a subsidy 
[Equivalent variations and excess burdens of a price subsidy that reduces the after-subsidy price from p0 
to p1 for individuals with different levels of demand for the subsidized good. The equivalent variation of 
the subsidy is increasing in the level of demand for the good (individual B’s equivalent variation, the area 
bounded by the vertices ABGF , exceeds individual A’s equivalent variation, the area bounded by the vertices 
ABDC). The excess burdens of the subsidy are independent of the level of demand and instead depend only 
on the slope. The excess burden of subsidizing individual A’s purchases of the good is the area bounded 
by the vertices CDE, and the excess burden of subsidizing individual B’s purchases of the good is the area 
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Figure 2: CDFs of Formal Care by Treatment Status 
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Figure 3: CDF of Formal Care, NLTCS 
[Data from the 1999 National Long-Term Care Survey. Hours of formal home care per week. Approximately 
86 percent of people consume no formal care. Two individuals consumed more than 168 hours of care per 
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Figure 4: CDF of Formal Care by ADLs 
[CDFs for people 65 and older with fewer than vs. at least two activities of daily living limitations. Data 
from the 1999 National Long-Term Care Survey. Hours of formal care per week. Two individuals reported 
consuming more than 168 hours of care per week and have been omitted from the figure.] 
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Figure 5: Distribution of the demand for formal care 
[Simulated distribution of formal care satiation points, α, in hours per week. The population is people age 
65 and older with at least two activities of daily living limitations. The mean is 21 hours per week.] 
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Figure 6: Equivalent variation of mixed cash/in-kind program as function of subsidy rate, σ 
[Equivalent variation of mixed cash/in-kind program as function of the subsidy rate, σ. Programs with larger 





Table 1: Summary Statistics and Balance Tests

Arkansas Florida New Jersey
Cash In-kind Difference Cash In-kind Difference Cash In-kind Difference
p-value p-value p-value 
Formal care hours, baseline 8.61 7.85 0.31 13.16 13.26 0.95 16.10 15.39 0.52 
Number unpaid caregivers, baseline 2.12 2.13 0.90 1.93 2.05 0.41 2.02 2.15 0.36 
Age 78.73 79.33 0.25 79.00 79.87 0.22 77.63 77.81 0.77 
Male 0.15 0.17 0.56 0.19 0.22 0.46 0.19 0.22 0.31 
White 0.61 0.63 0.60 0.67 0.72 0.21 0.50 0.57 0.11 
Less than high school degree 0.67 0.67 0.96 0.37 0.38 0.78 0.66 0.63 0.44 
High school degree 0.29 0.26 0.36 0.44 0.46 0.67 0.19 0.21 0.61 
College degree or more 0.03 0.05 0.13 0.17 0.14 0.33 0.11 0.13 0.36 
Health 3.25 3.28 0.70 3.12 3.22 0.17 3.13 3.24 0.07 
Lives alone 0.33 0.33 0.85 0.26 0.32 0.10 0.32 0.37 0.23 
Observations 428 432 . 245 237 . 312 292 . 
Means by state and type of transfer. P-value is for test of equality of means across the cash and in-kind groups within the state. Formal care hours and
number of unpaid caregivers are for the baseline survey at the time of randomization. Remaining variables are measured at the nine-month follow-up. 
Table 2: Summary Statistics for NLTCS
 
Mean Standard Deviation 
Formal care hours 3.34 17.53 
Number of ADLs 0.76 1.50 
Health 2.37 0.94 
Age 78.92 7.83 
Male 0.35 0.48 
Married 0.44 0.50 
Number in household 1.84 0.93 
Any children 0.80 0.40 
Income eligible for Medicaid 0.59 0.49 
Means and standard deviations of variables from the 1999 NLTCS Community survey. Number of observa­
tions is 5,147 for most variables. Self-rated health is relative to other persons the same age and varies from 
1 (excellent) to 4 (poor). Income eligible for Medicaid indicates whether the person’s income would qualify 
her for Medicaid HCBS in her state. 
43
 
Table 3: Average Hours of Formal Care by Treatment Group
 
Cash In-kind Difference p-value 
Overall 7.11 14.76 0.00 
Arkansas 6.94 11.00 0.00 
Florida 7.79 19.35 0.00 
New Jersey 6.81 16.60 0.00 
Means for formal home care hours per week. Cash indicates group received cash transfer; in-kind indicates 
group received traditional Medicaid home care. P-value for test of equality across groups shown in last 
column. Rows denote different samples. 
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Table 4: Sensitivity of Demand for Formal Care, First Stage Estimates
 
(1) (2) 
Assigned to cash 8.14*** 8.07*** 
(0.25) (0.25) 
Controls No Yes 
F-Statistic 1,066 1,046 
Mean market price 13.73 13.73 
Adjusted R-squared 0.35 0.37 
Observations 1,946 1,946 
Dependent variable is the marginal price of formal care. Data are from the Cash and Counseling experiments. 
Controls described in text are included in column (2). The mean price paid for formal care by the cash group 
is $11.02 per hour; for the in-kind group, it is $2.87 per hour. Robust standard errors reported. * p<0.10, 
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 5: The Sensitivity of the Demand for Formal Care to the Composition of Benefits
 
(1) (2) 
Price -1.85*** -1.82*** 
(0.17) (0.17) 
Controls No Yes 
Mean hours 10.89 10.89 
Observations 1,946 1,946 
Dependent variable is hours of formal care per week. Data are from the Cash and Counseling experiments. 
Columns (1) and (2) are IV Tobits where formal care hours are censored at zero. Controls described in text 





Table 6: Association of Observable Characteristics and Formal Care Hours

(1) (2) (3)	 (4) (5) (6) 
Use Care	 OLS | Positive Adjusted Hours Use Care OLS | Positive Adjusted Hours 
Care Care 
Age	 0.01*** 0.37 0.45*** 0.01*** 0.44 0.45*** 
(0.00) (0.25) (0.13) (0.00) (0.28) (0.13) 
Three ADLs -0.03 17.87** 5.34** -0.03 21.28** 6.49** 
(0.05) (7.13) (2.67) (0.05) (8.69) (3.00) 
Four ADLs 0.09* 14.91** 8.37** 0.08* 18.29** 8.23** 
(0.05) (7.13) (3.25) (0.05) (7.85) (3.30) 
Five ADLs 0.08* 31.30*** 13.60*** 0.06 28.66*** 12.16*** 
(0.04) (7.31) (3.50) (0.04) (7.79) (3.61) 
Six ADLs 0.13*** 39.76*** 22.60*** 0.13*** 43.30*** 22.90*** 
(0.05) (8.36) (4.40) (0.05) (9.50) (4.56) 
Good health 0.07 -4.06 -1.30 0.09 -4.28 0.21 
(0.07) (12.85) (5.11) (0.06) (13.28) (5.33) 
Fair health 0.15** -10.71 -0.55 0.14** -11.80 1.25 
(0.07) (12.04) (4.96) (0.06) (12.00) (5.18) 
Poor health 0.17** -1.40 3.25 0.18*** -2.40 5.24 
(0.07) (12.63) (5.24) (0.06) (13.24) (5.71) 
Male -0.06 -12.33** -3.62 -0.04 -10.93* -3.44 
(0.04) (5.79) (2.46) (0.04) (6.47) (2.65) 
Lives alone 0.16*** 20.44*** 16.53*** 0.15*** 18.89*** 15.29*** 
(0.04) (5.92) (3.44) (0.04) (6.44) (3.55) 
Has children -0.08* 7.22 1.80 -0.10** 7.09 0.11 
(0.05) (6.22) (3.47) (0.04) (7.24) (3.56) 
Income -0.09 9.70 -10.62 -0.10 4.14 -10.01 
(0.07) (11.57) (6.74) (0.07) (11.80) (6.72) 
Income squared 0.04* 1.48 4.46** 0.03* 2.47 4.40** 
(0.02) (2.80) (2.19) (0.02) (2.43) (2.16) 
State F.E. No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 872 331 872 872 331 872
Column (1) is probit where dependent variable is whether person had positive hours of formal care in past week. Column (2) regresses hours of care in past
week on covariates for subsample with positive hours. Column (3) uses the entire sample, but adjusts the hours of care used to reflect the price of care in
the state. Columns (4) - (6) same as (1) - (3) except that state fixed effects have been included. Income is measured in thousands of 1999 dollars. Omitted
categories are 2 ADLs and excellent health. Data are from the 1999 NLTCS. Robust standard errors reported. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Table 7: Heterogeneity in Demand for Formal Care
 
(1) (2) (3) 
State fixed effects 
If Positive Care 
0.07 




Health controls 0.12 0.21 0.13 
Informal care options 0.12 0.24 0.15 
Income 0.14 0.28 0.17 
Each cell reports the R-squared (columns (2) and (3)) or McFadden’s Pseudo R-squared (column (1)) of a 
regression of care hours on the specified set of variables. Column (1) is estimated with a probit; column (2) 
with OLS conditional on positive care hours; and column (3) with OLS. Each row adds the specified set of 
variables to the regression. Health controls include age, indicators for number of activities of daily living 
limitations, indicators for self-rated health, and gender. Informal care options include indicators for the 
whether person lives alone and whether she has children. Income includes a linear and a quadratic control 




Table 8: Summary Statistics by Take-up Decision, NLTCS
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Take-up = 0 Take-up = 1 Difference p-value 
Age 81.29 82.34 0.27 
Four or more ADLs 0.48 0.61 0.01 
If health fair or poor 0.64 0.76 0.02 
Male 0.32 0.22 0.04 
Lives alone 0.25 0.45 0.00 
Monthly income 919.42 665.37 0.00 
Means presented separately for those who had not taken up Medicaid home care (column (1)) and those 
who had (column (2)) as well as p-value from test of equality of means across groups. Data from the 1999 
NLTCS. Only those who had at least two activities of daily living limitations are included. This leads to a 





(1)	 (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
β Unid’d α’s State-dependent utility α distribution 
Baseline 0 25 50 0 Max 1 2 3 4 γ = 1 c̄ =$2.5k Drop α >50 α/2 
Optimal policy
Subsidy rate, σ ∗ 0.88 1.00 0.77 -0.50 0.94 0.86 1.30 -0.50 0.69 1.10 -0.50 0.89 0.59 0.75 
Equivalent variation over pure-cash policy, $1,000s
Optimal subsidy policy 5.53 7.60 0.71 0.00 6.09 4.28 >38.13 0.67 1.86 35.74 0.23 21.07 1.74 2.31 
First-best policy 9.38 7.60 1.96 0.22 8.35 9.52 - - - - -0.08 25.39 2.63 3.34 
Non-care consumption, $1,000s
Mean, optimal subsidy 15.83 15.00 20.75 21.87 15.14 15.98 12.89 20.38 16.97 14.30 20.38 15.77 17.30 16.34 
Mean, pure-cash policy 19.56 16.16 21.87 21.87 17.99 21.14 19.56 19.56 19.56 19.56 19.56 19.56 18.61 17.56 
Std. dev., optimal subsidy 1.24 0.00 1.17 0.00 0.65 1.34 3.20 6.03 3.00 1.05 6.03 1.13 1.56 1.22 
Std. dev., pure-cash policy 5.61 5.98 0.13 0.00 5.34 5.84 5.61 5.61 5.61 5.61 5.61 5.61 2.56 3.09 
Consumption distortion
Total CV over total cost 0.48 0.65 0.88 - 0.44 0.51 0.02 - 0.63 0.26 - 0.52 0.85 0.73 
E(q FC |optimal subsidy) 14.01 15.80 2.84 0.00 11.67 17.73 20.31 3.78 11.55 17.30 3.78 14.15 5.37 4.97 
E(q FC |pure-cash policy) 5.72 13.38 0.02 0.00 5.51 6.26 5.72 5.72 5.72 5.72 5.72 5.72 2.33 2.18 
Targeting benefit
Corr(marg. utility, CV) 0.84 0.90 0.24 -0.68 0.90 0.81 0.11 0.19 0.64 0.85 -0.94 0.81 0.74 0.81 
E(1(subsidy  cash pol.)) 0.16 0.24 0.04 0.00 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.83 0.15 0.15 0.83 0.16 0.18 0.13 
Table 9: Policy analysis and robustness. Column 1 presents results based on the baseline assumptions. Columns 2–5 vary the value of β away 
from the baseline value of 1.8. Columns 6 and 7 vary the values of the α’s corresponding to people who consume no formal care when facing a
positive price (which are only partially-identified). Column 6 sets these α’s to zero. Column 7 sets these α’s to the maximum value consistent
with these individuals’ choices to consume no formal care when facing a positive price. Columns 8–11 use different models of state-dependent
utility in which µ(α) is linear in α and in which the multiplier factors µ(α) vary by a factor of 100, maxα {µ(α)}/ minα {µ(α)} = 100. In columns
8 and 9, the utility function is “inner state-dependent.” In columns 10 and 11, the utility function is “outer state-dependent.” In columns 8 and
10, µ(α) is decreasing, and in columns 9 and 11, µ(α) is increasing. See Appendix C for more details about state-dependent utility. Column 12 
sets the coefficient of relative risk aversion to one (log utility), whereas the baseline coefficient of relative risk aversion is three. Column 13 sets
the consumption floor to $2,500, whereas the baseline value is $5,000. Column 14 drops values of α (formal care satiation levels) that exceed
50 hours per week. Column 15 cuts every α value in half. Subsidy rates are constrained to be no smaller than -0.5 (a 50 percent tax) and no
greater than 1.5 (a 150 percent subsidy, under which individuals are paid 50 percent of the market price to consume units of formal care). “Total
CV over cost” is the total ex-post compensating variation of benefi ts under the optimal program as a fraction of the total cost of these benefits.
Mean values of formal care consumption, E(q FC ), are in hours per week. “Corr(marg. utility, CV)” is the correlation between marginal utility
in the absence of any policy and the ex-post compensating variation of benefits under the optimal subsidy. “E(1(subsidy  cash pol.))” is the
fraction of people who prefer the optimal subsidy to the pure-cash policy benefit ex post. 
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Tag: Lives alone Tag: Number of ADL limitations

No Yes 2–4 5 6
 
Average formal care consumption, h/w 9.3 25.1 8.8 19.3 27.3 
Optimal policy, $s in $1,000s
Tagged pure-cash benefits, (B = b) 5.67 10.46 6.08 6.4 7.92 
Tagged mixed benefits, (B, σ, b) (5.67, 0.87, 1.4) (10.46, 0.9, 1.77) (6.02, 0.87, 1.52) (8.53, 0.9, 1.11) (7.92, 0.92, 0.68) 
Equivalent variation over untagged policy, $1s
Tagged pure-cash benefits, (B = b) 227 4 
Tagged mixed benefits, (B, σ, b) 44 8 
Targeting benefit
Corr(marg. utility, tagged pure-cash benefit) 0.20 0.05 
Table 10: Tags analysis. Average formal care consumption, in hours per week, is estimated in the NLTCS. The sample consists of people age 65
and older with at least two activities of daily living limitations. Subsidy rates are constrained to be no smaller than -0.5 (a 50 percent tax) and
no greater than 1.5 (a 150 percent subsidy, under which individuals are paid 50 percent of the market price to consume units of formal care).









A Theory Appendix 
A.1 The optimal mix of in-kind and cash benefits 
Consider a planner choosing how to allocate a given budget, B, between cash and in-kind 
benefits. The planner’s goal is to choose the benefits package that maximizes expected 
utility: 
max EU(σ) = v(p(σ),m(σ, B); θ)f(θ)dθ. 
σ Θ 
The first-order condition, which holds with equality at an interior optimum, σ∗ , 34 is 
dEU(σ∗) dv(p(σ∗),m(σ∗, B); θ) dV (σ∗ ; θ) 
= f(θ)dθ = EΘ λ(σ 
∗ ; θ) = 0 
dσ dσ dσΘ 
0 0 dxX (σ
∗ ; θ)⇐⇒ CovΘ λ(σ ∗ ; θ)xX (σ ∗ ; θ)pX = (σ ∗ pX )EΘ (λ(σ ∗ ; θ)) EΘ . (3)dσ 
The second version of Equation 3 shows that, at the margin at an optimum, the covariance 
between marginal utility and the level of demand for X must be the same sign as the mean omarginal change in X due to the shift in benefit composition, i.e., sign (CovΘ [λ(σ∗ ; θ)xX (σ∗ ; θ)pX 0 ]) = cc 
dxX (σ
∗ ;θ)sign EΘ 
o 




∗ ;θ) = 0, the optimal benefit composition fully eliminates the covariance between EΘ dσ 
marginal utility and the demand for X, CovΘ [λ(σ∗ ; θ)xX (σ∗ ; θ)p0 ] = 0. More generally, the X 
greater is the marginal distortion cost of shifting toward in-kind provision, the greater must 
be the marginal targeting benefit. 
The first version of Equation 3 implies that, at the margin at an interior optimum, the 
benefit to some types from shifting toward greater in-kind provision must be exactly offset 
by the cost to other types of this shift. Suppose there are just two types, L and H. Then at 
an interior optimum, the end of the first row of Equation 3 implies that at the margin the 
planner optimally imposes

dV (σ∗ ;θL) 
pH λH 
= 
dV (σ∗ ;θH ) (1 − pH )λL
dσ 
dollars’ worth of costs on L types in exchange for $1 worth of benefits to H types. The 
marginal willingness to pay in terms of costs imposed on Ls in order to help Hs by $1 is 
increasing in the ratio of the expected marginal utility of Hs to the expected marginal utility 
34In certain contexts, including possibly home care, it might be feasible to subsidize formal care at more 
than a 100 percent rate, so that consumers face a negative net-of-subsidy price of formal care. In this case, 
the subsidy rate σ can take any real value and the first-order condition holds with equality. A necessary 
condition for a greater-than-100-percent subsidy to be feasible is that recipients are not able to freely dispose 







A.2 First best 
In the first-best case, an individual’s type, θ, is verifiable. In this case the planner can choose 
different (b, σ) benefit bundles for different types. The total derivative of type θ’s indirect 





= λ(σ; θ) xX (σ; θ)p 
0 
X − xX (σ; θ)p 0 X − (σpX )0
dxX (σ; θ) 
dσ
 
0 = −λ(σ; θ)(σpX ) 





which is negative for all positive subsidy rates. When type is verifiable, a pure cash contract 
is optimal, and the cash benefits for each type are chosen to equalize each type’s marginal 
utility. Verifiable types means that the planner can redistribute across types without resort­
ing to distortions, so there is no motive for introducing a distortion in this case. 
B	 Robustness and Generalizability of the Estimate of 
the Demand for Formal Home Care 
As we discuss in Section 6, the key conclusion about the desirability of subsidizing formal 
care is robust to a wide range of values of the price sensitivity of demand for formal care. But 
the magnitudes of the optimal subsidy and the welfare gains from in-kind provision depend 
on the particular value of the price sensitivity of demand. The price sensitivity of demand for 
care is important for other questions as well, including the extent to which private long-term 
care insurance contracts that subsidize formal care suffer from a “moral hazard tax.” In this 
section, we address issues related to both the internal and external validity of our estimates 
of the price sensitivity of demand for formal care. 
B.1 Internal validity 
There are two main threats to the internal validity of our estimate of the price sensitivity 
of demand for formal care. The first is quantity constraints that might limit consumption 
of traditional Medicaid home care. If quantity constraints bind, the first stage of our IV 
overstates the change in prices (marginal values) associated with being randomized to the 
cash group and thereby leads us to underestimate the price sensitivity of demand. Quantity 
constraints may have taken two main forms in this context: supply constraints and statutory 
or de facto limits on Medicaid home care benefits. 
Supply constraints are thought to have faced Medicaid home care recipients in Arkansas 
during the period of the Cash and Counseling experiment (Brown et al., 2007). These 
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constraints apparently arose from some combination of Medicaid paying below-market prices 
and the local home care market being in disequilibrium around the time of the experiment. 
To the extent that such issues were important, ignoring them would tend to lead us to 
underestimate the true price sensitivity of demand. The simplest way to avoid this issue is 
to drop Arkansas from the analysis and instead focus on Florida and New Jersey. 
Quantity constraints may also have arisen from statutory or de facto limits on how much 
Medicaid home care people can use. Both Arkansas and New Jersey had statutory limits 
on Medicaid home care—16 hours per week in Arkansas and 25 hours per week in New 
Jersey. (Florida had no statutory limit.) Moreover, as discussed in the text, the amount of 
Medicaid home care that someone can consume is determined by a care plan written by the 
individual’s physician. If physicians, whether in an effort to be “good agents” of Medicaid 
or for other reasons, prescribe care plans whose hours fall short of their patients’ satiation 
points, then Medicaid home care recipients may not be able to reach their satiation points. 
Although in principle the combination of maximum benefit limits and care plan limits could 
limit the quantity of Medicaid home care available to recipients, in practice it does not appear 
that either one of these constraints significantly constrained consumption. On care plans, 
many recipients consume strictly less than their care plan hours, and it is not clear what 
incentive physicians may have to restrict hours. If anything, physicians’ professional norms 
and ethos might lead them to act as an agent of the patient rather than Medicaid. Maxi­
mum benefit limits also appear to be less binding than might have been expected. LeBlanc 
et al. (2001) survey Medicaid home care programs and discuss several explicit mechanisms 
for granting exceptions to the limits. For example, in New Jersey, where the statutory limit 
was 25 hours per week, with prior authorization a recipient could receive between 26 and 40 
hours of care per week and with central office approval a recipient could receive as much care 
as “needed.” Consistent with these or other mechanisms relaxing quantity limits, the distri­
butions of formal care hours among Cash and Counseling participants receiving traditional 
Medicaid home care do not exhibit much bunching around these limits. If the limits were 
binding, one would expect significant bunching because a binding limit causes a convex kink 
in the budget constraint between formal care and all other goods.35 Figures D.1–D.3 present 
the CDFs of formal care hours for people randomized to the in-kind group in each of the 
three Cash and Counseling states. In Arkansas (Figure D.1), there is no apparent bunching 
that would suggest that consumption was constrained by the state’s limit. In addition to 
there not being a large mass point at 16 hours, nearly one-fifth of the sample consumed 
more care than the state’s limit. In New Jersey (Figure D.3), there is bunching at certain 
points in the CDF of care hours, but this appears to be more of a function of rounding 
than any limits being imposed. The mass points at 15 and 20 hours (8 and 9 percent of the 
distribution, respectively) are similarly sized to the mass point at the statutory limit of 25 
hours (11 percent). 
In Table D.1, we present estimates of the price sensitivity of formal care for each state. The 
first row shows that the IV Tobit estimates range from -0.96 (Arkansas) to -2.79 (Florida). 
In the second row, we impose the upper bounds on care hours implied by the Arkansas 
35Of course, any test of bunching faces the limitation that measurement error lessens observed bunching. 
A useful feature of our context in this regard is that the tested-for kink in the budget constraint is quite 
sharp, from zero up to the market price. To the extent that care limits were truly binding, one might expect 
the limits to be highly salient to recipients and as a result perhaps less attenuation from reporting error. 
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and New Jersey limits. We censor observations above those cutoffs and use the IV Tobit 
to re-estimate the price sensitivity. The additional censoring reduces our estimated price 
sensitivity in Arkansas but increases it in New Jersey. (We exclude Florida since care hours 
are not limited there.) The differences across states are similar to those found with the 
standard IV Tobit. 
Generally, the results are consistent with the concern that quantity constraints—whether 
from supply constraints in Arkansas or statutory limits in Arkansas and New Jersey—might 
be biasing our price sensitivity estimates towards zero. The state without limits (Florida) 
consistently displays greater price sensitivity than the other states. Because average care 
consumption is so different across states, it is also useful to consider the percentage changes 
implied by the coefficients. A one-dollar increase in the price of formal care is estimated to 
increase formal care consumption by 9 percent in Arkansas, 14 percent in Florida, and 10 
percent in New Jersey. The results also reveal important heterogeneity in price sensitivity 
across states above and beyond that which appears to be due to quantity constraints. We 
return to this issue in our discussion of external validity below. 
The second main threat to the internal validity of our estimate of the price sensitivity of 
demand for formal care is the distributional assumptions we make in the estimation. The key 
assumption we make is that the unobservables are jointly normally distributed (particularly 
that εi, the residual in the latent demand function, is normal). This assumption is important 
because the majority of the cash group and a large minority of the in-kind group do not 
consume any formal care. People who do not consume any formal care are at a corner, 
so revealed preference analysis only bounds their level of demand. The Tobit normality 
assumption is one way among many to deal with this missing data problem. 
We test the sensitivity of our results to a number of different distributional assumptions on 
εi. In each case, we continue to instrument for price as we did in the main analysis. These 
results can be found in Table D.2. As seen in columns (2) through (4), the estimated price 
sensitivity changes somewhat from one specification to the next but not dramatically so. 
In the next four columns of Table D.2, we assume that everyone who is potentially at a 
corner solution has a marginal value of care of exactly p, the maximum consistent with their 
behavior. As seen in Figure 2, those in the cash group were more likely to consume zero 
hours of care than those in the in-kind group. In a Tobit model, this greater mass at the 
censoring point tends to reduce the (latent) mean of the care hours distribution for the cash 
group relative to the in-kind group. The 2SLS model does not have this feature and, as a 
result, tends to produce smaller mean differences between the cash and in-kind groups. In 
our setting, this translates into a smaller price sensitivity. Again, we instrument for the price 
of care with each participant’s randomly assigned transfer type. Under these assumptions, 
we tend to find a price sensitivity around -1. 
As we show in Section 6, only values of the price sensitivity far greater than any we find 
in this appendix section can overturn the result that the optimal subsidy on formal care is 





The generalizability of the results from the Cash and Counseling experiments to other con­
texts depends on the similarity of the experiments’ participants to various populations of 
interest (in terms of price sensitivity of demand for formal care) and how well the experiments 
match various policies of interest. 
Cash and Counseling participants are unlikely to be representative of Americans 65 and older 
in bad health. Most participants selected into Medicaid home care, and Medicaid home care 
recipients have a greater demand for formal care than the population as a whole. The partic­
ipants are also unlikely to be representative of the broader population of Medicaid home care 
recipients. Participation in the Cash and Counseling demonstrations is voluntary and the 
benefits are increasing in the price sensitivity of demand for formal care. By participating, 
an individual gains the possibility of receiving in cash roughly the cost to Medicaid of pro­
viding their formal care benefit. The extent to which an individual values the cash benefit 
more than the in-kind benefit is increasing in the sensitivity of the individual’s demand for 
formal care to its price. It is natural to expect that participants in the experiments were 
more sensitive to the price of formal care than the broader population of Medicaid home 
care recipients in the Cash and Counseling states. This tends to increase our estimate of the 
price sensitivity of demand for formal care relative to what we would expect to find among 
the broader population of recipients of Medicaid home care. 
Another reason the results of the Cash and Counseling experiments might not generalize well 
to other contexts is the nature of the experiment itself. Care-giving arrangements, for which 
people often make important investments such as moving or adjusting their labor supply, 
likely depend on both the past history of policies and expectations about future policies. 
People arrange their lives in order to make the best of the choices available to them, and 
their decisions about where to live and work and whether to use formal or informal home 
care likely depend on the nature of any home care benefits for which they might be eligible. 
The Cash and Counseling experiments likely came as a surprise to many participants, and it 
is unclear what participants might have expected about the persistence of this policy—would 
it continue indefinitely or would they soon be reverted back to traditional Medicaid home 
care? Both the surprise aspect and the uncertainty about how long cash benefits might 
last likely dampened responses relative to what they would have been under an anticipated, 
permanent policy. 
These considerations suggest caution in applying the results of the Cash and Counseling 
experiments to other contexts. But the robustness of our main conclusions to even large 
changes in the price sensitivity of demand for formal care greatly limit this concern in our 
context. And the strengths of the Cash and Counseling experiments—the large, exogenous 
price variation—make it a valuable piece of evidence about the demand for formal care and 
the effects of alternative home care-related policies. 
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C Policy Analysis 
C.1 Estimating the distribution of demand for formal care 
As discussed in the text, we use the observed distribution of formal care consumption together 
with our estimate of the price sensitivity of demand for formal care to infer the latent 
distribution of the level of demand for formal care. We express the level of demand for 
formal care in terms of satiation points, α. The only tricky part of this calculation is that 
observed formal care consumption does not point-identify α for people consuming zero formal 
care, it only bounds it: αi ≤ βpi. We estimate the full α distribution, including the α’s of 
people who consume zero formal care, in three steps. 
The first step involves using the observed distribution of formal care consumption, q, to infer 
the partially-unobserved distribution of latent demand, q ∗, where qi = max{0, q ∗}. In the i 
baseline specification, we fill in the censored values of qi 
∗ corresponding to the qi = 0 cases by 
linearly extrapolating the observed q density among people with small positive quantities. 
In particular, we calculate the number of people in each of two groups: those who consume 
more than zero and less than five hours of care per week and those who consume more than 
five and less than ten hours of care per week. Based on the shares of people in each group, we 
estimate the implied (constant) slope of the probability density function over this range and 
its level at q ∗ = 0. We assume that this slope remains constant at lower values of q ∗, which 
amounts to assuming that the left part of the underlying latent quantity distribution has a 
triangular distribution. For each censored q ∗ (corresponding to an individual who consumed 
no formal care at market prices), we draw the underlying latent q ∗ from the truncated triangle 
distribution based on the estimated slope. Figure D.4 shows the underlying distribution of 
formal care consumption on which this calculation is based. 
Second, we convert each q ∗ to its corresponding α using the estimated price sensitivity 
of demand for formal care, αi = qi 
∗(p) + βp. This adjusts (potentially latent) formal care 
consumption by our estimate of the impact of the price on consumption. Finally, we estimate 
the kernel density of the implied α distribution. Figure 5 shows the resulting α distribution. 
It is mostly just a rightward-shifted version of the observed distribution of formal care 
consumption, with adjustments for the censoring of people who consume no formal care. 
For the tags analysis, we repeat the same procedure for estimating the α distribution sepa­
rately for different groups of people, as defined by their tagged characteristics. Figures D.5 
and D.6 show the α distributions of people who do vs. do not live alone and for people 
with different numbers of activities of daily living limitations. All of the distributions are 
similarly-shaped, and they exhibit the expected differences in levels. The demand for formal 
care is greater among people who live alone than among people who live with others, and it 
is greater among people with more activities of daily living limitations. 
We test the robustness of our results to making different extreme assumptions about how to 
fill in the unidentified α values. In one case, we set every unidentified α value to zero, which 
is equivalent to assuming that anyone who consumed no care when facing market prices 
would also consume no care when facing a price of zero. In the other extreme, we set all of 





As discussed in the text, any state-dependence in utility that is correlated with formal care 
consumption is centrally important for the value of in-kind provision, since it affects the 
value of redistribution across people with different levels of demand for formal care. State-
dependence that increases the marginal utility of people with greater demand for formal care 
relative to people with lower demand for formal care increases the attractiveness of in-kind 
formal care transfers, whereas state-dependence that decreases the marginal utility of people 
with greater demand for formal care relative to people with lower demand for formal care 
decreases the attractiveness of in-kind formal care transfers. Given the possibility that people 
with different demands for formal care might have systematically different utility functions, 
it is therefore important to test the robustness of the results to different possibilities about 
state-dependent utility.36 
Two natural ways in which to model state-dependent utility are to introduce a scaling factor 
on the outside or inside of the utility function:  
µ(θ)u(c), “outer state-dependence”; 
U(c; θ) =
u(µ(θ)c), “inner state-dependence”. 
“Outer state-dependence” multiplies the standard, type-independent component of the util­
ity function by a factor µ(θ) ≥ 0, which is potentially correlated with demand for formal 
care. This type of state dependence has a straightforward effect on the value of redistribution 
across types. Types with greater scaling factors have greater marginal utility for any given 
level of net consumption. “Inner state-dependence” multiplies net consumption (non-care 
consumption net of any utility costs of residual health problems) inside the standard, type-
independent utility function. Unlike “outer state-dependence,” “inner state-dependence” 
can have a subtle effect on the marginal utility of a given level of net consumption. On the 
one hand, types with greater scaling factors are more effective at converting income into net 
consumption (“effective consumption” is µ(θ)c, which is increasing in µ(θ) for any c), which 
tends to increase the marginal utility of income. On the other hand, types with greater scal­
ing factors have greater effective consumption for any given level of net consumption, which 
tends to reduce the marginal utility of income due to marginal utility diminishing in the 
level of effective net consumption. With log utility, these two effects cancel out, and “inner 
state-dependence” has no effect on the marginal utility of income. With preferences in which 
marginal utility diminishes more rapidly in effective consumption, such as constant relative 
risk aversion preferences with a coefficient of risk aversion greater than one, the latter effect 
dominates and types with greater scaling factors have lower marginal utility for any given 
level of net consumption. 
36Although health-dependent utility is a natural concern, in the context of home care benefits its impor­
tance is somewhat diminished by the fact that most home care benefit programs limit eligibility to people 
with at least two activities of daily living limitations. This ensures that home care benefits go only to people 
who have fairly severe chronic health problems. As a result, the type of state-dependence of utility that is 
relevant for the design of home care benefits (taking as given the eligibility criteria for home care benefits) 
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Figure D.1: CDF of Formal Care in Cash and Counseling States, Arkansas 
[Data from the Cash and Counseling follow-up survey of the in-kind group in Arkansas. Formal care is 
measured in hours per week. Arkansas had a regulation that limited care to 16 hours per week (LeBlanc 
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Figure D.2: CDF of Formal Care in Cash and Counseling States, Florida 
[Data from the Cash and Counseling follow-up survey of the in-kind group in Florida. Formal care is 
measured in hours per week. Florida had no regulation limiting care hours (LeBlanc et al., 2001). The 
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Figure D.3: CDF of Formal Care in Cash and Counseling States, New Jersey 
[Data from the Cash and Counseling follow-up survey of the in-kind group in New Jersey. Formal care is 
measured in hours per week. New Jersey had a regulation that limited care to 25 hours per week (LeBlanc 
et al., 2001). The vertical dotted lines mark 10, 15, 20, and 25 hours per week for reference.] 
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Figure D.4: Distribution of formal care consumption among people with two or more ADL 
limitations 
[Distribution of formal care consumption among people with two or more activity of daily living limitations 
in the NLTCS. The figure omits the 65 percent of people who report consuming no formal care and the 3 
percent of people who report consuming more than 150 hours per week of formal care for readability. The 
mean of the full distribution is 12 hours per week.] 
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Figure D.5: Distribution of demand for formal care by whether someone lives alone 
[Estimated probability density functions of formal care satiation points, α, for each of two groups: people 
who do not live alone (left-most pdf) and people who do live alone (right-most pdf). The mean of the 
distribution is 16 hours per week among people who do not live alone and 37 hours per week among people 
who do live alone.] 
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Figure D.6: Distribution of demand for formal care by number of ADL limitations 
[Estimated probability density functions of formal care satiation points, α, for each of three groups: people 
with 2–4 ADL limitations (left-most pdf), people with five ADL limitations (middle pdf), and people with 
six ADL limitations (right-most pdf). The mean of the distribution is 16 hours per week among people 
with 2–4 ADL limitations, 31 hours per week among people with 5 ADL limitations, and 34 hours per week 
among people with six ADL limitations.] 
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Table D.1: Sensitivity of Demand and Statutory Limits
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Dependent variable is hours of formal care per week. Data are from the Cash and Counseling experiments. 
Seperate regressions run for each state with IV Tobit (first row). Second row uses IV Tobit and imposes 
statutory limits as upper bounds on care hours. Controls described in text are included in all regressions. 





Table D.2: The Sensitivity of the Demand for Formal Care to the Composition of Benefits

Censored errors Uncensored errors

Normal Extreme Logistic T-location Normal Negative Poisson 
Value scale binomial 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Price -1.85*** -2.47*** -1.40*** -1.21*** -0.94*** -0.72*** -1.07*** 
(0.14) (0.24) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.21) 
Mean hours 10.89 10.89 10.89 10.89 10.89 10.89 10.89 
Observations 1,946 1,946 1,946 1,946 1,946 1,946 1,946 
Dependent variable is hours of formal care per week. Data are from the Cash and Counseling experiments. Columns (1) - (4) are IV specifications where the
error term is treated as censored on the left. Each column presents the estimated sensitivity of demand under a different distributional assumption on the
underlying error term. Columns (5)-(7) use distributions that implicitly assume there is no censoring on the left. All models instrument for price with the
participant’s randomized treatment status and are estimated via two-stage residual inclusion. for columns (6) and (7), average marginal eff ects are reported.
* p< ** p0.10, <0.05, *** p<0.01 
